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FOREWORD 
This is on® of a series of reports resulting from 
the military timber products studies mad® by the Forest 
Service for the Corps of Engineers. It is an analysis of 
problems that arose to delay or otherwise oodify the orderly 
flow of timber products froa the woods to the military 
supplier or consumer. Other reportm to follow include; 
{1} An analysis of the total volume of timber products re­
quested through the Central Procuring Agency, Corps of 
Inginners, by all war agencies during the war years, and 
(2) a final detailed report of estimated total consumption 
of all timber products for military purposes during World 
War II. 
The timber products studies are financed by the 
Corps of Engineers, 
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CHAPTER I 
IITROBUCTIGff 
I. PUBPOSE 
The purpose of this report is to identify the prob­
lems which were obstacles to satisfactory timber products 
procurement during the World War II emergency, and to 
determine why these problems arose. A knowledge of the 
causes and results of these problems should be helpful in 
planning prooureaent and production changes to minimize 
these difficulties in the future. 
II. SCOPE 
This report deals- with the problems that arose in 
obtaining timber products for Military and related uses dur­
ing 1941-45. la the first part of this period procurement 
was decentralized; whereas, later, the Central Procuring 
Agency was charged with the responsibility of procuring tim­
ber products* The agencies and their contractors, covered 
by this report, are the following: Army {including Air-
force), Mary, Maritime Commission, Defense Plant Corporation, 
War Shipping Administration, Lend Lease. 
The satisfaction of requirements of timber products 
needed for war must be viewed in the dual light of both 
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production and procurement. It is a production problem that 
adequate and satisfactory amounts of all needed timber com­
modities are manufactured at the right time for needed uses. 
In this category are the problems of adequate forest resourc­
es, sufficient plant capacity, and manpower, and equipment 
requirements. On the procurement side are the problems of 
organisation and personnel as well as administrative dif­
ficulties, procurement procedure, and problems of improper 
specifications. In short, procurement problems deal with the 
difficulties of dividing among the essential uses a given 
amount of timber products. Production problems are those 
encountered in creating that "given amount of timber prod­
ucts." 
It is apparent that where production problems are at 
the heart of a procurement difficulty, the smoothest func­
tioning procurement organization could do little to allevi­
ate the situation. Nevertheless, there were many instances 
during the last emergency when the principal difficulty in 
obtaining certain timber products was due to procurement 
problems and not production factors. However, since the 
problems of procurement were often the result of difficulties 
in other fields of supply, this report includes an analysis 
of the entire field in order to present the procurement fac­
tors in their proper setting. 
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III. THB TIMBER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY 
Warfare has developed into a contest of resources and 
mechanical ingenuity. Wood is one of those resources and 
the art and technique of converting forest trees Into use­
able, wood commodities requires technical skills and equip­
ment that are just as important to a war effort as the 
production of food, munitions, or clothing. Hearly all use# 
for wood, either newly developed or old, sooner or later are 
pressed into service in waging a war. In order to understand 
the problems of production and procurement of these timber 
products, the nature of the industry must be understood. 
Because of the complexity of the timber products in­
dustry due to the wide diversity of products, the geographi­
cal distribution of the timber resource, the great variety 
of tree species, each having diverse mechanical and physical 
properties as well as the many different grades of lumber 
within each species, the multitude of independent producers, 
and the intricate pattern of distribution to consumers, it 
is no wonder that problems arose when it became necessary to 
shift the bulk of the industry*s output into channels for 
military use. 
At the start of mobilization for defense In 1941, the 
nation was in a peculiarly favorable situation for the 
developments that were t© follow* A long period of depressed 
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construction had built up a full supply of lumber stocks 
amounting to approximately eighteen billion board feet, 
Also, the grade pattern within these inventories was aloost 
perfectly complete. It was only this fortunately large buf­
fering supply of stocks that enabled the quick delivery of 
construction materials to expanding military installations 
and war contractors. By 1945, total lumber stocks were re­
duced to four and one half billion board feet and these con­
sisted essentially of pipe-line stocks and a broken assort­
ment of sizes and grades. 
Sawmill capacity within the industry has traditional­
ly been in excess of needs. In fact, excess capacity has 
been a source of instability and economic weakness in the 
industry. In 1947 there was a total of 53,109 active and 
£,442 idle sawmills. This contracts with about 39,000 active 
mills in 1942. The increase was due largely to the favorable 
price of lumber. However, some production bottlenecks devel­
oped during the war in facilities other than sawmills. Lack 
of dry kilns slowed lumber production for a time. Treating 
plant facilities as well as shortages of preservatives slowed 
the treatment of railroad ties, transmission poles, and pil­
ing. Production of veneer and plywood has never been able 
to keep pace with demands. In 1949, the softwood plywood 
industry was comprised of 5? plants on the west coast, whi^e 
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hardwood plywood and veneer is produced in the East in nearly 
500 plants. 
The pattern of sawmill production Is an important con* 
sideration of the lumber industry. About ninety-one percent 
of the active mills are located in the East, but the nine 
percent of the aills situated in the West produce nearly half 
•of the nation1 s lumber. The contrast of production by aill 
size is also remarkable. A quarter of the total production 
in 1947 was sawed in but 165 of the largest mills. Half of 
the total production was produced in but 3.5 percent of all 
the mills. At the other extreme, 15,000 of the smallest 
mills produced but a negligible aroount of lumber. Mill size 
and numbers are important in production controls. The ex­
treme concentrations, both productively and geographically, 
in the Pacific lorthwest is misleading, however, because 
that production is all of softwood species, while the hard­
wood lumber produced in the widely scattered and numerous 
eastern mills is a vital war material. 
Lumber is the foremost product in volume cut from our 
forests. About seventy percent of the sawtiatber used is con­
sumed as lumber. The veneer and plywood industry, although 
closely integrated with the lumber industry through & common 
source of raw material, is otherwise quite distinct. With­
out reflecting relative importance* log consunption in the 
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veneer and plywood industry in recent years has totaled only 
about five percent of the log consumption for lumber, but the 
quality of loga used for veneer and plywood is much higher 
than those required for lumber,, The practical operating 
capacity of these two industries is set by a combination of 
(1) supplies of suitable timber, (2} plant capacity, (3) a-
vailability of manpower for logging and manufacturing opera­
tions, and (4) available supplies of logging and manufactur­
ing equipment, repair parts, etc. Output of logs is the 
basic determinant of the capacity of both Industries. 
Lumber production has never reached the peak it achiev­
ed just after the turn of the century. Mills then were oper­
ating in virgin timber and demands for housing and other uses 
in settling the West enabled a production of forty-four bil­
lion board feet. During the depression 193 Gf s production 
was in the twenty billions of board feet. In 1941 and 1942 
lumber output rose to thirty-six billion feet for each year, 
but production difficulties in the war economy reduced the 
production to twenty-eight billion feet in 1945. 
The total production of veneer, including that market­
ed as plywood, has approximately doubled since 1935® la 
194? the all-veneer production totaled 13.4 billion square 
feet. The growth of the softwood plywood industry accounted 
for much of this increase, having quadrupled its output in 
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this period to reach a production of two billion square feet 
(3/3-inch equivalent basis) in 1949- The proportion of soft­
wood and hardwood veneer in terms of log consumption are now. 
approximately equal, 
Railroad ties are a vital necessity for trail trans­
portation which is so imperative in wartime. No satisfactory 
substitute has been found to displace wood in this use, al­
though preservative treatment has lengthened the service-life 
of ties from a life expectancy of five to six years when 
untreated to fifteen to thirty years when treated. This 
materially conserves on requirements by reducing the replace-
meats needed. 
It takes about three thousand ties to lay a mile of 
main line track. Oak, the predominant species used, account­
ed for about a third of the total production in 1949. Next 
in order were southern piae fourteen percent, gum thirteen 
percent, Douglas fir nine percent, and thirty-one percent ia 
other species. Perhaps eighty to ninety percent of total 
production of cross ties is iadicated in the figures of in­
stalled ties of United States railroads. Replacements and 
new installations during the 1935-49 period averaged about 
forty-nine million ties annually. That figure was swelled to 
fifty-seven million in 1942 by the war emergency, but steadi­
ly dropped thereafter to only thirty-six million in 1949. 
Production of sawed ties and lumber are alternative operations 
g 
and tie production in a given mill often varies widely over 
time, depending upon relative price and Market demands be­
tween ties and lumber. 
A large amount of wood volume is taken fro® our for­
ests and used without much change in form. Some of these 
commodities are directly important to a war effort. For ex­
ample, the piling used for wharfs, and the utility poles used 
at eaaps, posts, and stations. Other round or split wood 
commodities have various degrees of importance and are usual­
ly indirectly connected with military operations. Examples 
of these are: nine timbers, the importance of which is ob­
vious; posts, for fara fencing which is a part of food produc­
tion; arid fuel wood. Wood for fuel is second only to lumber 
in the commodity drain from our forests. However, its use 
as a substitute for other combustibles during both World Wars 
was never fully exploited. 
Most poles and piling are handled by concentration 
yards where the output froo a rather wide territory is 
typically concentrated. These yards are mainly permanent 
establishments with seasoning facilities, pole handling ma­
chinery, and equipment for treating with wood preservatives. 
In these concentration yards, pole shaving machines are used 
for removing bark and smoothing pole surfaces, and the poles 
are roofed, gained, bored, and incised prior to treatment 
with preservatives. Preservative equipment used for treating 
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these products ranges from simple dipping tanks for butt 
treatment to full-length, complex, pressurised cylinders. 
About ninety-five percent of all utility poles used are 
treated with preservatives, while but sixty percent of the 
piling consumption is treated, explainable by the use of 
considerable quantities of untreated hardwood piles. 
Pole production during the 1935-49 period varied from 
about two million pieces in 1943 to nine Billion poles in 
1947. Southern pine usually accounts for three-fourths of 
the pole production, with western red cedar and Douglas-fir 
equally divided to make up a sixth, and the balance of other 
species. Piling averages only about fourteen percent of 
pole production, which varied fro® 12.7 million linear feet 
in 1935 to a wartime peak of 42.2 Million linear feet in 
1942. Like poles, three-fourths of the piling used is south-
era pine, followed by a fifth of Bouglas-fir, and the rest 
of other species. 
Several miscellaneous timber products industries are 
insignificant in terms of wood-volume output, but they rose 
to dramatic bottlenecks during the war effort. The problems 
they caused will be treated later, but they are mentioned 
here to complete the survey of the timber products industry# 
Among these miscellaneous timber products industries are th# 
cooperage industry, the wood turnery industry, shoe lasts 
and related products nsaauf actur e, the excelsior industry. 
10 
and commodities mad© of corfc. 
To produce adequate timber products is but part of the 
task of satisfying demands for these commodities. Across 
the complex pattern of production must be laid the equally 
diversified web of consumption with its myriad spread of 
specifications and species demands pirns the equally important 
time element of delivery. Furthermore, the producing saw-
Rills and plywood mills* as well as the other timber products 
plants, are located where the trees grow and this does not 
usually coincide with the heavily populated consuming centers® 
The marketing machinery for lumber is the most elaborately 
developed, while other timber products usually follow a more 
direct route to the consumer. In any case, the existing 
marketing machinery cannot be circumvented by wartime distri­
bution methods without serious hardship to the industry 
either during the emergency or is reconversion later to 
peacetime activity. 
Wholesale lumber dealers say be roughly grouped into 
two classes, the "yard" wholesalers and the "office" whole­
salers, the terras being practically self-explanatory. Tard 
wholesalers are divided into those operating concentration 
yards and those who operate distribution yards. There are 
about 450 concentration yards, located chiefly in the South, 
where they centralize the output of numerous small sawmills. 
They way sort* grade» season, surface, and remanufacture the 
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raw lumber they receive to enable the® to ship seasoned lum­
ber ia carload lots by species, size and grade as desired. 
Small sawmills are not capable of performing this function. 
Wholesale distributing yards are generally located in some 
center of lumber consumption. The distributing yard buys 
carload lots of seasoned* well-manufactured stock from manu-
; , 
fscturers of recognized standing, puts the lumber in stock 
and then sells it to his trade in industry or to retail out­
lets. 
The office wholesaler operates no yard at all. He 
facilitates shipment direct from producer to buyer, and is 
generally situated in the consuming territory. A large-scale, 
office wholesaler may have staffs of salesmen and buyers and 
a traffic department to expedite shipments, ie earns his 
usual profit in selling at a margin above costs, but may 
finance sawmills, a practice which is quite common. Commis­
sion salesmen perform services halfway between the wholesaler 
and a salaried sales force of the producer. By this means 
the sawmill operator can maintain customer contact by direct 
invoicing, thus keeping the identity of the mill before the 
customer. The commission man is usually recognized as the 
representative of the manufacturer and may represent two or 
more producers of the same or different species. There are 
nearly six thousand lumber wholesale distributors and com­
mission men. 
CHAPTER II 
PROBLEMS OF Til PRODUCER OR SUPPLIES 
PRODUCTION PROBLEMS 
Early in the defense program the War Production Board 
and the industry alike shared the impression that lumber 
would continue to be available ia any needed amount for any 
war purpose, and that it could serve as a substitute for the 
more critical metals. Misinformed confidence in abundance 
even permitted civilian wood-using industries to expand. 
fhis surface cala was broken ia 1942 when the transition from 
surplus to scarcity erupted with alarming seriousness. A 
little later, as the military position changed, the great 
demand for construction lumber gave way to an almost insati­
able appetite for shipping lumber with which to supply the 
offensives under way on world-wide war fronts. 
The shortage in volume of lumber and other timber 
products somewhat obscured certain quality shortages that 
occurred early in the emergency and in many cases existed all 
through the w%r and were never truly eliminated. Examples 
of this type of shortage were aircraft-quality Douglas-fir 
and spruce lumber, birch and mahogany veneer for plane con­
struction, oak for ship building, and many specialty items 
of exacting quality demands. 
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Over all>of the production problems hang a general 
lack of appreciation of the problems of the industry by 
those outside it and an equal lack of appreciation of war 
demands for timber products within the industry. This sec­
tion of the report alas to outline the major problems of 
production encountered during the last emergency. They in­
dicate the need for a high order of production planning as 
a wise course for future wood-for-war production. 
TIE PROBLEM Of FOREST RESOURCES 
Production of timber products requires forest re­
sources. Authorities**- judged the forest resource situation 
was serious in this country before the war, and certainly 
the accelerated drain during the emergency in no way better­
ed the situation. To many ^victory" in World War II is takes 
us synonoaous with "sufficiency." That the war effort goal 
was reached seems to obscure the difficulties of obtaining 
the necessary timber products, shades the fact that better 
timber and more desirable species could have added greater 
efficiency to the struggle, and generally blanket as unim­
portant the depletion of our forest resources. 
National Plan for American Forestry, Senate Docu­
ment #12, 73rd Congress, 1st Session, 1933, and the Report of 
the Joint Committee on Forestry, Senate Document #32, 77th 
Congress, 1st Session, 1941* 
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For the country as a whole the problem of inadequate 
stumpage for construction lumber was not high on the list of 
factors affecting production. There ware localities where 
mills were forced to cease operation, but there were a great 
«any more places where logs became difficult to get and those 
that were obtained, in most cases, were of inferior quality. 
Satisfactory Douglas-fir peeler logs were especially in short 
supply. The war-time drain of thesa high-quality logs around 
Paget Sound was not to b# fully appreciated until after the 
conflict. Currently, some plywood mills in that area are be­
ing forced to seek their log supply elsewhere. 
Presently inaccessible timber deters production just 
as effectively as the lack of forest resources. In certain 
sections of the country, especially the mountainous area of 
the west, there are considerable quantities of desirable 
timber that have remained unavailable, largely because of the 
excessive cost of logging it. The major cost in such opera­
tions is the expense of road construction into these diffi-
cult-to-reach areas. In June, 1942, Congress passed the 
Access loads Act which provided funds which could be used 
for improving existing roads or the construction of new roads 
to tap additional timber resources urgently needed in the 
war. Five months later, twenty-six projects were approved 
totaling 354 miles for an estimated expenditure of about 1.3 
billion dollars* These projects opened up 10.^ billion board 
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feet of standing timber. It was reported that this material­
ly aided production. The program is commendable in bringing 
a larger forest area into commercial production and manage­
ment, relieving some pressure on the more accessible and 
over-cut areas, and provided immediate results in increased 
production of quality raw materials from virgin stands. The 
Forest Service is asking Congress for five million dollars 
to build access roads in the next budget period. 
Quality hardwood stumpage and certain softwood species 
and grades were important resource problems during th® emer­
gency. the big problem and bottleneck in the production of 
am ay wood specialty items was the lack of suitable raw mater* 
i&ls. For use in a number of these items, the species and 
quality specified cannot be readily substituted. The fact 
that this type of production problem arose early in the war 
and most of them either remained unsolved or were alleviated 
with much difficulty leads to the conclusion that this re­
source deficiency deserves careful consideration. An import­
ant aspect of the problem is the length of time it takes to 
grow timber. The wood uses in which inadequate and unsatis­
factory forest resources posed a problem are listed below: 
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LIST OF CEITIClLLf SHORT 
Mm 
Hickory Specialty Items 
Ski blanks, handle 
blanks, picker sticks, 
shunt poles, ladder 
rungs 
Ash Specialty Iteas 
Lifting tool handles 
Boat oars 
Whits Oak 
Ship timbers 
Truck body material 
kalnut 
Qua stock blanks 
Iallow Poplar 
Aircraft veneer 
Aircraft lumber 
Dogwood and Persiiamon 
TIMBER PRODUCTS IM WORLD WAR II* 
Remarks 
Timber is scattered; before war 
most of logs were hauled to 
mills by farmers# Shortage of 
far® labor and low ceiling prle* 
es on hickory logs adversely 
affected production of logs 
which was bottleneck in produc­
ing these items. Picker sticks 
for textile industry and shunt 
poles for railroad industry were 
taken in large volume by England 
on Lend Lease* 
Ash timber suitable for these 
uses getting -scarce. Problem 
same as hickory. 
Oak timber suitable for ship 
timbers not available in large 
quantities. Used laminated 
timbers during war to supple­
ment supply. Truck body lumber 
specifications were rigid and 
requirements higher than supply. 
Finally modified specifica­
tions. 
*rees are scattered. Difficul­
ty in meeting requirements due 
to specialised industry, large 
requirements and scattered 
timber. 
Supply timber suitable to pro­
duce clear long lengths is 
limited. 
Timber is scattered and was 
usually supplied by farm labor 
before war and problea was same 
as for hickory. Lend Lease 
took large quantities to British 
textile industry. 
•From a letter in the files of the Corps of Engineers. 
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Port Orford Cedar 
Battery separators 
Boat planking 
Supply of timber diminishing 
rapidly* Is only wood suitable 
for certain technical battery 
separators of which large 
quantities were required by 
England for direct military 
purposes. Other woods could be 
used for boat planking and much 
of the boat planking was pro­
duced from logs that would not 
make battery separators. 
Imported Woods 
Mahogany for planes and 
boats 
Teak for ship decking 
Balsa, for flotation 
equipment 
Raw cork for insulation 
and gaskets 
Lignum Vitae for underwater 
bearings 
Maple 
Shoe lasts 
Die blocks 
Veneer logs 
All of these items were in tight 
supply and requirements had to 
be adjusted downward to meet 
supply. 
Chestnut 
Tanin extract 
Locust 
Insulator pins 
Clearheart Red Cypress 
Southern Pine 
Vertical grain ship 
decking 
All chestnut has been killed by 
blight and remaining standing 
dead chestnut trees getting 
scarce. 
Requirements were high for a 
while and price of locust cord-* 
wood was out of line with pulp-
wood prices which discouraged 
production. Timber is scattered 
but supply is ample. 
Supply limited. Especially 
timber to produce a clear wide 
and long lengths. 
id 
Douglas Fir 
Ponton chess 
Ship decking 
12 s* to 16* widths 
Ship plank 
12» widths 
WC" & Btr Clear 
12" aad wider 
Wood Stave Tank and Pipe Stock 
Ponderosa Pine 
BC" Select and Btr. 
All sizes 
Sugar Piae 
nCn 3elect and Btr, 
Pattern Stock 
All sises 
Port Orford Cedar 
Alaskan Yellow Cedar 
Boat Stock 
All sizes 
Western Red Cedar 
Poles 
Class 3 & larger, 45' and longer 
Preservative treated lumber, Insufficient treating capacity* 
Piles, poles, all to meet demand during World 
species War II. Capacity has not been 
materially increased. 
Kilo Dried lumber n n n 
All species 
THE PROBLEM OF MANPOWER SHORTAGE 
Luaber production was affected early in the war by 
manpower shortages and the problem remained critical until 
after V-J Day. For at least the latter half of this period 
the manpower shortage was by far the most serious immediate 
problem facing the industry. 
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The shortage was due both to a lack of workers and to 
the lowered effectiveness of those remaining in the industry. 
The problem was universal in that all types of aills and all 
sections of the country were affected. Although manpower 
shortages were experienced in virtually every industry there 
is good reason to believe that the lumber industry was par­
ticularly at a disadvantage in coping with the manpower 
problems. The reasons for this are partly inherent in the 
lumber industry and partly the result of the war-time complex 
©f industrial, military and agricultural activities in which 
lumber production was rather unsuccessfully competing for a 
position of comparable essentiality. There were three major 
causes of the manpower probl^j they are: (1) Migration from 
lumber to other industries, {2} Military enlistments and 
Selective Service inductions, and (3) Absenteeism and turn­
over. 
Selective Service losses, especially toward the last, 
were extremely serious. The industry was at a particular 
disadvantage in the following respects. In the woods, even 
wore than in the aills, young, able-bodied men occupied a 
large number of positions which could not adequately be 
filled by older workers. Few other industries are as arduous 
and dangerous as logging. This fact explains an important 
part of the woods labor problem when it is considered that 
the draft removed virtually all full-tin© woods®®** under the 
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age ©f twenty-six and a large proportion of all full-time 
workers under thirty. The impact of the draft ©a the lumber 
Industry, particularly the woods industry, was increased by 
the fact that lumbering is predominantly a rural industry,, 
competing in war-time with agriculture for its labor. Rural 
draft boards, acting under the Tydings amendment, gave a 
large share of their deferments to young farmers aad had to 
make up the difference by drafting woodsmen, When farmers 
were drafted, lumber production was often affected since it 
is comraon practice for farmers to engage in a sideline of 
logging and lumbering la slack seasons. One of the »ost 
serious aspects of this general problem involved the reaoval 
of key workers, especially small operators whose loss usual­
ly threw from two to twenty more employees out of lumber 
production. 
Migration of a very large number of lumber company 
employees was of extreme importance in curtailing output. 
The reasons for migration lies in the actual and imagined 
disadvantages in the life of a lumberman, coupled with the 
real and imagined advantages of a »war plant" job. Recruit­
ment activities of Federal Agencies and war plan agents wert 
persistent and widespread. The lowliest workers in the most 
remote places were repeatedly sought with offers of almost 
fabulous pay, paid transportation, and negligible expenses. 
Important inducement a were the legends (often substantiated) 
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of easy work and featherbedding, unlimited overtime and 
other advantages, 
Absenteeism and turnover among lumber workers was a 
very serious problem* These factors are traditional in both 
woods and mills, but during the war, losses mounted out of 
all reason in wany cases* Some claimed that absenteeism 
jumped when wages went up, others looked to increased wages 
as a solution to the difficulty. However, the average lumber 
worker in the average camp or aill town seemed t© be more 
demoralised than spurred on to more work by a big pay check* 
In any event, pay rates are a key factor affecting produc­
tion and are involved in union activity and government pol­
icy, aside from affecting the bargaining position of the 
industry. 
In summarizing, it might be said that the particular 
and rather peculiar requirements of the industry were not 
understood, nor were preventative steps correctly aligned 
with the problem, with the result that adequate and realistic 
aid was not extended by agencies controlling manpower fac­
tors. 
In the first place, a large segment of the lumber 
industry is primarily a small-unit industry more comparable 
to farming in many respects than to industrial organisation* 
Only a few operators can reasonably be expected to respond 
to, or utilise, the type of coatrals and facilities set up 
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for ordinary units* Their lack of powerful political or in­
dustrial representation was a great disadvantage. 
The War Manpower Commission, with the United States 
Employment Service, exercised great authority through its 
control of labor, hut it is not apparent that any activity 
of this agency was to the positive widespread advantage of 
lumber production* Labor stabilisation orders were gener­
ally a one-way road permitting loss of workers from lumber 
mills to higher paid, easier occupations. Ineffective con­
trols permitted theai to leave an occupation which had no 
counterbalancing inflow of satisfactory labor* The only 
counterbalancing effect was the use of abnormal sources of 
labor such as women, children, cripples, prisoners of war, 
and foreigners. The numbers of workmen in the industry 
toward the end of the war were bo indication of the actual 
labor shortage. The creaia of the labor had been gone for 
months and years. Woods work is young men*s work, but the 
average age of lumberjacks in at least one Upper Peninsula 
Michigan camp was over fifty years. 
The isolated and individualized nature of much of the 
lumber industry aade it difficult for manpower controls to 
be exercised. Many of the men felt that no war-time control 
could reach them for some special reason. Men who were mil­
itarily eligible but in deferred classifications were quite 
likely to be mmmplmry workers. If such a man became over­
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age or otherwise unfit for military service, he very of tea 
abandoned consistent production in favor of absenteeism, 
job-hunting, non-essential occupation, aad similar activi­
ties,, The poor eoapetitive position of the jobs available 
also contributed to the general lack of servicing of the 
Industry by war agencies whose stated function was to sup­
ply manpower and keep it on the job. Ironically, the War 
Department for many months forbad® the us® of prisoners of 
war in logging and lumbering, erroneously holding that it 
was in violation of the Geneva Convention* After it was dis­
covered that actually such use was advocated by the Conven­
tion, lumber operators found almost every conceivable impedi­
ment in the way of obtaining prisoners of war for their 
labor needs. Labor unions did not welcome the idea of using 
prisoner of war labor and this view was shared by some labor 
conciliators. 
THE PROBLEM OF EQUIPMENT SIOSTAOES 
Shortages of certain items of heavy equipment together 
with the necessary tires, replacement parts, and operating 
naterials had a direct bearing on the amounts of timber prod­
ucts produced during the emergency. Among the items needed 
by the industry which hindered production the most were 
crawler tractors, wheel type tractors, trucks, lift and 
lumber carriers, stationary power units, ®otor graders, 
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cranes and shovels and miscellaneous Items of dirt moving 
equipment needed for the construction of logging roads. 
fires, replacement parts, gasoline, and permanent type anti­
freeze were among the subsidiary needs that became problems. 
Shortage of these items of equipment were second only 
to shortage of labor in affecting the production of timber 
products. In fact, shortage of labor tended to augment the 
demand and need for equipment, since aost operators, in the 
face of dwindling labor supplies, were forced to mechanize 
their operations to offset lack of asanpower, thereby greatly 
increasing the demand for scarce items of heavy equipment. 
Approximately eighty percent of the total volume of 
sawlogs is carried by trucks all or part way from the woods 
to the sawmills. In 1941 an estimated 36,000 truck units 
were in either full or part-time use in logging and lumber 
production, or an estimated full-time equivalent of 52,000 
trucks and 25,000 trailers. 
Annual replacement needs were estimated to be 11,666 
trucks. Heavy duty trucks and other heavy duty equipment 
competed directly with military requirements. For example, 
lift trucks and lumber carriers, machines developed original­
ly by and for the lumber industry, were in great demand by 
the Army and Navy for use at docks and on construction pro­
jects for use in handling construction materials. Similarly, 
they war# seeded around sawmills to handle lumber and, since 
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one machine could accomplish the work of about twenty m&n 
handling lumber by hand, the demand for them was tremendous 
and neyer could be fully met. The trend of ia creased demand 
for labor saving equipment t© expand production is also ex­
emplified in tractors, During the five year period immediate­
ly preceding the war, the average yearly demand for tractors 
in the lumber industry was 1,$00 units* there was a steady 
increase during the war years until ia 1945 the need, based 
upon closely screened applications, was for 4,000 units of 
&11 size classes, 
fire controls posed some difficult problems. For 
example, prior to the war the losing industry had been using 
a special type tire, particularly in the Pacific lorthwest, 
where the loads were heavy due to the large size of the logs* 
To reduce the load and weight., enabling the use of smaller 
tires, slows production and adds, to logging cost, yet as soon 
us the war started these special tires were practically elim­
inated from civilian consumption* The industry was forced 
to use inferior tires with shorter life in the face of a 
shortage of tires for replacement purposes. There were 
Instances when the military agencies actually suffered fro® 
lack of lumber because the lumber industry lacked tire# that 
the military had taken. 
Local shortages in gasoline supplies occurred, but 
seldom interfered with direct productive processes. Some 
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lumber wholesalers, log buyers, graders, and other specialists 
ia the industry were hindered in travel by automobile. Ethyl­
ene glycol base anti-freeze, being a diversion of explosive 
manufacture, naturally same into tight war-time supply. Lack 
of foresight and planning for anti-freeze needs for the timber 
industry unnecessarily delayed and curtailed production8 
Certain Miscellaneous equipment and supplies commonly 
utilized by logging, sawmill, and other wood working indus­
tries, because of their scarcity in civilian supply developed 
into inconveniences affecting production* The principal 
items werej aianila ropet work gloves, work shoes and boots, 
wool underwear, work clothing, and sawbits. They, at no 
time, were a serious deterrent to total production, but were 
acute handicaps in some areas due to unbalanced distribution. 
Inequities in food rationing were of a more serious 
nature, Logging requires extreme physical exertion and 
necessitates the highest food calorie intake of any of the 
heavy industrieso Allotted the same rations as tea-rooms and 
drug stores, logging camps quickly ran out of meats, fats, 
sugar, coffee, and processed foods* Their isolated location 
prohibited effective supplementation with fresh vegetables 
and some other non-rationed foods. After considerable delay 
and hindered production, differential rationing by the Office 
of Price Administration at least partially corrected the 
situation* 
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Til PROBLEM OP ADVERSE AMD UNSEASONABLE WEATHER 
The very nature of the timber products Industry makes 
It vulnerable to weather conditions. The normal operating 
procedure is cyclic in the industry in order to adjust pro­
duct ion to seasonal fluctuation in the weather. For example, 
in parts of the Lake States, swamps and bogs prohibit much 
woods activity until they freeze over during the winter, thus 
delays in freezing, intermittent thaws., and early springs can 
cause serious production handicaps there. On the other hand, 
unusual cold spells can freeze log ponds at mills and stop or 
materially delay production. Normal snows may be useful in 
packing and sraoo thing roads as well as enabling sled logging, 
but deep or wind-drifted snows may stall log transportation. 
The usual rains are always taken into account, however, heavy 
or unseasonable rains can cause great production handicaps 
ranging from muddy, impassable roads and washed out culverts, 
and bridges to flooded bottomlands, mill settings, and lost 
log booms. Even high winds cause delays in blowing down 
numerous trees that block logging roads. Storms also cause 
difficult salvage jobs by causing jackstraw arrangements of 
interlocked stems in blow-down area3. 
The importance of weather handicaps varies in differ­
ent regions of the country, but everywhere weather must be 
considered as a production factor. l*og production is the 
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fflost vulnerable to weather, Belays in log production com­
monly ar« not felt on the lumber Market for some time as log 
inventories may delay the incidence of the deficiency. Al­
though nothing can be done directly to forestall adverse and 
unseasonable weather, awareness of the nature of the problem 
enables circumvention tactics by increased production during 
seasonable weather, 
THE PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES DEVELOPED XI PRODUCTION CONTROLS 
Production controls in the timber products industry 
can be envisioned as nets thrown over 31,000 sawmills; some 
25,000 retail, wholesale, and concentration yards; 20,000 
»aanufacturers of a multitude of wood products; over 75,000 
consumers of box and crating lumber; and countless thousands 
of other customers including utilities, railroads, construc­
tion contractors, and millions of farmers, homeowners, and 
other small consumers. The complexity becomes even more 
formidable, when products other than lumber are added to the 
above figures. That soiae slipped through the nets, or were 
outside their reach is understandable. 
Reviewed in the context of other war-time controls over 
distribution of individual materials, the history of lumber 
stands among the more successful examples of government man­
agement in the national emergency. A good part of the credit 
for this performance must g& to the fact that luaber became 
critical later in the war than most other basis materials* 
imt the willingness of the top staff of the Lumber Division, 
as well as the planning and policy-making personnel of the 
War Production Board (WPB) and the procurement and distribu­
tive personnel•of the military agencies, to lean on exper­
iences of success and failure in related control problems 
for other materials was almost unique. 
Problems and controls influencing timber products 
production and distribution, for convenience in discussion, 
may be divided into these categories; (1) WPB Controls of 
Production and Distribution, (2) Office of Price Administra­
tion (OPA) Price Controls, and (3) Seed for Coordinated 
Controls* 
WPB Controls of Production and Distribution. At an 
early stage in the war, controls of timber products distribu­
tion split into at least five directions, reflecting the 
complex and different conditions of production and distribu­
tion^These lines of growth were;—(1) Control of Imported 
Woods, (2) Control of Aircraft Lumber, (3) Control of Ply­
wood and ¥eneer, (4) Control of Hardwood Tiaiber Products, 
(5) Control of Softwood Lumber. 
The first line of growth, illustrated by the controls 
established over imported woods, involved woods which were 
of relatively minor importance tjuanU. Ui tively, but of con­
siderable significance at certain key points in the war 
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program. The growth pattern for administrative management, 
over foreign, woods followed a simple three-phase history; 
(1) loss of, or maintenance of only a hazardous contact with, 
principal sources of supply; (2) drastic limitation of ship­
ping space to bring in foreign stocks; (3} issuance of VPB 
control orders prohibiting virtually all non-military con-
sumption. These orders are contained in the appendix* 
The second .line of early control development was that 
worked out for aircraft' lumber (principally western soft­
woods: Sitka spruce$ Hoble fir, and western hemlock). The 
special characteristics of producers and consumers of this 
type of lumber made the control of its distribution relatively 
simple. For the same reason, however, the possibilities of 
extending a parallel technique to other woods were limited. 
The production of aircraft lumber required top grades 
of logs and skilled sawing. To secure this performance in 
production, the Lumber Division, through its Western Log and 
Lumber Administrator at Portland, Oregon, allocated the sup­
ply of logs of Sitka spruce, western hemlock, and Noble fir 
to sawmills and directed sawmills' shipments. Any sawmill 
desiring to cut lumber from these types of logs filed a 
monthly allocation request with the Western Administrator. 
On the basis of these applications, the Administrator allo­
cated the output of specific producers to the sawmills. 
Distribution of aircraft lumber by sawmill operators was also 
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controlled by the Administrator through monthly shipment 
directives. 
A third line of control development was characterised 
by the techniques worked out for plywood and veneer. The 
two types of plywood, softwood and hardwood, differ markedly. 
Softwood plywood is produced by a relatively small group of 
plants located ia the West Coast States* Its wartime 
quantity uses were for military housing, pontoon bridges, 
ship interiors, packaging, and lifeboats. Hardwood plywood 
and hardwood veneers were manufactured in a number of plants, 
both large and snail, some independent and others captive to 
such industries as furniture. Hardwood plywood and veneer 
found wartime uses in combat aircraft and training planes, 
landing craft and torpedo boats, furniture and shipping con­
tainers. 
The early distribution history of softwood plywood 
was marked by assistance for the more important direct mili­
tary uses through the preference rating machinery. Priori­
ties were issued by the military agencies and the Industry 
Divisions of the War Production Board. As in so many other 
instances in which the priority power was freely granted to 
independent agencies and industry divisions, the Lumber 
Division of the War Production Board could not exercise any 
over-all integrated control. Widespread substitution of 
softwood plywood and other materials* often without regard 
for its more appropriate uses, failure to screes require­
ments for its more important uses, and the absence of any 
procedure to provide a systematic review of orders on the 
books of producers resulted in the accumulation of serious 
backlog. By late spring of 1943, approximately ninety per­
cent of manufacturers' shipments were being made on orders 
rated AM and AA-1, while ninety-eight percent of new orders 
bore AA-1 preference ratings. 
Early in the war the Lumber Division made several 
attempts to allocate logs to specific plywood manufacturers 
to institute an allocation system for all softwood plywood 
production. There was general opposition to such a program 
by the military services, for reasons parallel to those 
which supported the opposition of authority into the hands 
of a civilian agency. The increasing pressure on producers* 
backlogs, the steady deterioration in the significance of 
preference ratings as applied to softwood plywood, and the 
growing volume of upset production schedules resulting from 
finally forced the acceptance of a total allocation system. 
The administrative aspects of this system were relatively 
simple, inasmuch as the allocation machinery covered only 
thirty-three manufacturiag establishments serving less than 
one thousand different consumers. 
As in the case of softwood plywood, hardwood veneer 
most important uses 
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started its wartia® distribution history under the impact of 
preference ratings which were extended to the manufacturers 
of hardwood plywood by the producers of end products. The 
supply-demand balance, however, was considerably more favor­
able and it did not prove necessary to move into an alloca­
tion system. The pressure on producers was eased at least 
to the balancing point through efforts to limit the quantities 
of plywood going into non-essential uses. 
The control problem for hardwood timber products, 
which illustrates the fourth line of control technique devel­
opment , was more complex. A large number of species are 
included within this general category, each with special 
characteristics which adapts its use for certain purposes. 
The production of each individual species is relatively small, 
as is total hardwood production when compared with total 
production of softwood. The principal wartime uaes of hard­
woods were in construction, mine supports, ships, aircraft, 
vehicle bodies, tool handles, gun stocks, textile machinery 
parts, and shoe lasts. Over-all war distribution of hard­
wood lumber was substantially in the following pattern: 
factory use, thirty-four percent; box and crating, thirty-
nine percent! civilian construction (chiefly railroads and 
defense housing), nineteen percent; and military construc­
tion and Lend-Lease, eight percent. 
The early approach to the control of distribution of 
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hardwood timber products was through preference ratings. 
For a time, the Lumber Division attempted to discourage it, 
but was finally compelled to begin issuing preference ratings 
in order to regain some control over distribution. Prefer­
ence ratings for hardwood lumber were being issued by the 
military agencies and by some of the WPB Industry Divisions, 
Sawmills found it necessary to establish a rating pattern 
for their shipments in order to qualify for assistance in 
procuring aaintenance and repair materials* Only by issuing 
ratings, therefore, could the Lumber Division secure delivery 
on orders which it judged to be essential. 
The net result of this development was a familiar 
one, the race of preference ratings for the highest category* 
fall control could not be exercised by the Lumber Division 
while the authority to issue ratings without quantitative 
restriction was retained by other divisions of the War Pro­
duction Board and by the military agencies. Hardwoods, 
therefor®, continued to be procured with preference ratings 
for uses which the Lumber Division often appraised as non­
essential. Preference ratings assigned under the Controlled 
Materials Plan for fabricated products and non-controlled 
materials were often high enough to procure lumber in large 
quantities for relatively non-essential uses. One of the 
aiore serious situations of this type was created by the is­
suance of & Controlled Materials Plan preference rating for 
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a. production schedule requiring only a small allotment of 
steel for nails or metal cleats, but a substantial quantity 
of lumber procurable with the high rating* This type of 
activity continually negated the pattern of essentiality 
established by the Lumber Division. 
With production of hardwood lumber in from eight to 
ten thousand small mills, located throughout the United 
State® east of the Eocky Mountains, the establishment of a 
distribution eontrol starting at the mill was most difficult# 
The condition existing in the spring of 1943 was one of 
drift. The Lumber Division assumed no responsibility for 
the positive direction of the movement of hardwood. This 
inertia permitted, in fact required, the Central Procuring 
Agency2 of the military services to exercise positive con­
trol. Enforcing no conscious direction over the distribution 
of hardwood lumber, and lacking information on the character 
2 The Central Procuring Agency was created on Septem­
ber 1, 1942, to centralize purchasing of lumber for the War 
and Navy Departments, Maritime Commission, Defense Plant 
Corporation, and Lend-Lease. The principal reason for its 
organisation was to cut through the confusion created by the 
uncoordinated and competitive purchasing of construction lum­
ber by the various service arms. As its operating experience 
developed, CPA1s responsibility was extended t© cover the 
procurement of lumber for any purpose in which any of the 
competing services was concerned. The Central Procurement 
Agency made no accounting to WPB for its purchases. Inevi­
tably, the growing strength and responsibility of CPA sapped 
the control authority of the Lumber Division of WPB. 
and location of consumption, the Lumber Division was in the 
position of observer rather than of responsible controlling 
agency* 1PB control orders relating to hardwood are con­
tained in the appendix, 
The fifth development and chief control problem of 
the Lumber Division was softwood lumber, the production of 
which accounted for five-sixths of total output, and the 
uses of which mounted into the thousands, la 1942, almost 
seventy-five percent of the consumption of softwood lumber 
was in construction, another twenty percent was for box and 
crating, .and the balance was eonsttaied in the manufacture of 
wood products. In 1943, consumption for box and crating 
mounted sharply, the curtailment being absorbed largely by 
civilian construction* On# other complicating factor was 
introduced by the widespread production of softwood lumber 
in almost 30,000 sawmills, many of which were- very small and 
produced only a few inferior grades. 
The softwood control problem made its appearance as 
both a general problem and a series of special problems. 
Aircraft lumber was predominantly softwood, Douglas-fir, the 
chief, all-purpose wood, was in demand for aircraft lumber, 
ship decking, marginal planking, pontoon lumber, softwood 
plywood, and other high-stress requirements. By early 19431 
requirements for this species were so large that the substi­
tution of structural steel for Douglas-fir was being 
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encouraged—a total reversal of the 1941-42 line of material 
substitution® Douglas-fir and the other western softwoods 
were also in demand for shell and ammunition containers <, 
The lower grades of western softwoods and the eastern soft­
woods, principally yellow pine, were in demand for construc­
tion purposes, for containers, and for general manufacturing 
uses,, In dealing with these diverse control problems, the 
Lumber Division attempted to distinguish between the special 
aad general uses of softwoods. 
The first control over Douglas-fir reworked the now-
familiar pattern* WPB Order L-21& provided unlimited pro­
curement authority for the Central Procurement Agency of the 
armed services and its desi@iated contractors. All other 
distribution was subject to special authorization by the War 
Production Board« This was one more example of abdication 
by the Lumber Division and the transfer of the reality of 
control to the Central Procuring Agency, the actions of which 
were uncontrolled and largely unreported. The control orders 
relating to softwood are contained in the appendix. 
Increased buying pressure on softwoods, induced par­
ticularly by the control over Douglas-fir distribution, led 
to the issuance of the western lumber order L-290* Under 
this order, the larger producers of the controlled species 
(production in excess of 10,000 board feet daily) were pro­
hibited fro.® shipping to any purchaser except to or -for the 
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account of the Central Procuring Agency, on® of its designat­
ed contractors, to or for the account of other government 
agencies9 or on special WPB~releases« 
The order accomplished for western softwoods what 
L-21& had done for Douglas-fir* The Military services were 
given unrestricted procurement authority; civilian users were 
compelled to apply to the Lumber Division for individual 
authorisation of purchase orders,, The net gain was in two 
parts: first., the elimination of non-essential civilian uses 
through screening of individual applications; and second, the 
prevention of the indiscriminate issuance of rating authority 
by the industry divisions of the War Production Board. The 
philosophy underlying the action assumed that the elimination 
of elearly non-essential civilian uses would provide enough 
western lumber for all other wartime needs® The order did 
nothing to bring the reins of control within the grtsp of the 
Lumber Division. 
Because of the relatively wide range of substitutabil-
ity between species in lumber, the successive imposition of 
controls over species preferred for military purposes threw 
heavy residual pressures on the remaining species, and prin­
cipally on yellow pine, by far the aosfc important quantita­
tively, Here finally was felt the mounting pressure of 
requirements, for containers, general manufacturing uses, 
and civilian construction* 
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The first move toward easing the pressure was the is­
suance in January, 1943, of M-206, establishing a special 
rating system for non-preferred uses of lumber,, Preference 
ratings were assigned to itemized us©® of lumber, with a 
ceiling at AA-2X« Inevitably, the scheme did not work, Mil­
itary and Lend-Lease ratings, and ratings issued under the 
Controlled Materials Plan for fabricated products and non-
controlled materials, almost uniformly outranked M-208 rat­
ings* And beyond this difficulty was the underlying objec­
tion t© the course of aetion pursued by the Lumber Division 
in most of its other control actions—-unlimited authority to 
assign ratings was retained by the military agencies and by 
fPB*s Industry Divisions. Within the self-imposed limits 
of this situation, the Lumber -Division could act only in 
terms of expediency* It was ignorant of the consumption of 
softwood lumber for each class of use and was compelled to 
rely on estimates prepared by the Forest Service, which at 
best were crude approximations in terms so broad as to be 
useless for purposes of over-all allocation. 
This was one of the most serious handicaps to the 
growth of an integrated lumber distribution control system. 
Beginning with the early summer of 1942, the Lumber Division 
repeatedly requested the claimant agencies to submit require­
ments for lumber, showing the types, species, grades, and 
sines neededo 1© satisfactory requirements data were 
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submitted by any claimant during the balance of the year* 
It was sot until well into 1943 that the division was able 
to assemble relatively complete and comparable statements 
from the principal claimant agencies* Even at this point., 
there was no way to test the validity of the stated needs* 
There were a number of obstacles to the compilation 
©f a complete statement of requirements. Outstanding among 
them was the argument among and within the claisnants' organ­
izations with respect to the size of their real lumber needs, 
fhis argument was a reflection of the early neglect of lumber 
as a significant war material, rapid changes in the magnitude 
of requirements, and the failure to build trained staffs 
capable of making the translations necessary to compile reaa«* 
©nably accurate requirements estimates. A second obstacle 
was the absence of clearly defined areas of responsibility 
for the presentation of requirements* Probably the most ob­
vious and difficult problem was presented by containers* 
The Containers Division of the War Production Board was asked 
to act as claimant for part of the supply of lumber, but no 
agency was in a position to estimate its requirements of 
containers. Nor could an intelligent judgment be made by 
the Lumber Division with respect to the appropriate division 
of responsibility for presentation of requirements by the 
military agencies^ Finally, there was no dir«®t connection 
established between the presentation of requirements esti-
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oat®s and the actual procurement of lumber0 The agencies 
which were called upon to submit requirements did not theo-
selvey directly control the procurement of the total quanti­
ties for which they were standing as sponsors* Ibis rela­
tionship tended to oak® it difficult to estimate requirements, 
to define areas of responsibility, and to compel the claimants 
to present such estimates promptly. 
In the absence of the presentation of direct require-* 
ments estimates by the claimant agencies, an effort to fore­
cast lumber consumption was made by the Forest Service of 
the Department of Agriculture in cooperation with WPB* s 
Statistics Division. These estimates divided anticipated 
©oasunptloa between hardwoods and softwoods and for each of 
these classifications among direct military use, indirect 
military use, and civilian use. The estimates were based on 
lumber content factors tested by the Forest Service over a 
period of years. 
The adoption of the Controlled Materials Plan as the 
principal metal allocation system inevitably led to its con­
sideration for lumber. The Controlled Materials Plan, how­
ever, required that material be identified with its immediate 
and ultimate use and associated with the end use of the final 
product in which it was incorporated. This was workable 
within the Controlled Materials Plan framework because the 
controlled materials were almost universally purchased for 
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particular production purposes and ordered in terms of 
weight, sis®, and composition specifications. Lumber, on 
the other hand, was used in large quantities for boxing, 
crating, dunnage, shoring, maintenance and repairs, and a 
multitude of other uses for which exclusive and individual 
purchase specifications were not essential. Consequently, it 
was concluded that any effort to saddle the industrial system 
with an unrealistic and unworkable end-use system within the 
framework of flexibility in application which characterised 
lumber utilization would to® likely to fail. 
A different and potentially more serious problem was 
presented when consideration turned to the character of lumber 
producers and consumers as contrasted with the producers and. 
consumers of the three major controlled materials. It was 
recognised that it would be difficult to establish full con« 
trol over the output of the 31,000 sawmills, most of which 
were extremely small and located in remote places. These 
small mills could not be expected to provide detailed re­
ports on shipments and unfilled orders parallel to those 
supplied, by the steel, copper, and aluminum mills* It was 
agreed at an early stage that control of lumber at the mill 
shipment level could be extended only to those species pro­
duced by a relatively small number of mills, each one of 
which was large enough to maintain records of shipments and 
to receive and summarise allotments appearing on consumer 
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purchase orders. 
This type of control was imposed is 1943 on the pro­
ducers of western softwood and softwood plywood. A large 
part ©f the over-all lumber problem, however, centered in 
woods which could not readily be ©©strolled in this way, es­
pecially the southern and eastern pines, the species of 
lumber produced in the greatest quantities and by the largest 
number of mills. 
By late 1943, the type of control represented by the 
orders governing the principal hardwood and softwood species 
had become inadequate; it failed to provide the management 
tools required to deal intelligently and efficiently with 
current problems. Outstanding preference ratings were in 
excess of supply, and control through the priority system 
was breaking down. This situation paralleled in a dramatic 
way the conditions governing the distribution of metals in 
1941 and early 1942. The most important consumers of lumber 
were free, under the existing orders, to procure and consume 
without direct quantitative control over their actions. 
Other essential uses were handled on a day-to-day basis with­
out reference t© the total supply-demand balance as the basis 
for approval or disapproval of individual requests. There 
was a© opportunity to appraise one application against 
another in terms of available supply and the needs of alter­
native users. 
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The administrative problem of controlling the produc­
tion and distribution of lumber, following the inexorable 
pressures of wartime demand, had progressed froa disorder 
through confusion to chaos* In teras of even minimum esti­
mates, military and essential civiliaa requirementa were ia 
excess of probable supply# But complete, detailed, and 
reasonably valid requirements statements had not been sub­
mitted to the Lumber Division* The Division had no practical 
working control over procurement. The military services 
were permitted to buy as much lumber as they wanted, without 
restriction as to species or grade* The WPB industry divi­
sions were generally free to assign preference ratings good 
for quantitatively uncontrolled lumber procurement. Impor­
tant non-military and military-supporting uses, such as 
containers, agriculture, railroads, and housing, were at a 
disadvantage relative to the dominant procurement position 
of the military agencies. This situation was made progres­
sively worse by the Lumber Division*s policy of rescuing 
endangered military requirements by the issuance of orders 
which denied all lumber to non-military uses except through 
specific application and release. Under this policy, there 
was no assurance that essential civilian uses would receive 
even their minimum requirements. For the military agencies, 
the Central Procurement Agency performed a large and expand­
ing function with ultimate responsibility for the procurement 
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of lumber for any use in which its sponsors were interested. 
A necessary concomitant of the power of the Central Procure-
seat Agency was the administrative weakness of th© Lumber 
Division* It was a source of power for the Central Procure­
ment Agency, but its grants of management authority were is* 
sued as blank checks which were always covered by restriction 
of other procurement. Sine© a large part of th# demand for 
lumber not provided for by Central Procurement Agency procur#-
stent- was of indirect military significance—as in containers, 
reels, matches„ and wood products—the unrestrained purchasing 
activity of the military often was the source of their own 
troubles* Beyond all else, the heart of the problem lay in 
a conflict of management philosophies. The personnel of the 
¥PB Lumber Division had generally accepted its function to 
fee the expediting of military requirements rather than the 
administration of the distribution of total lumber supply to 
all claimants. 
f© deal with this situation, a wholly new approach 
was mad© to the problem of administrative control. An allo­
cation mechanism was designed to assist the War Production 
Board to pro grata the distribution of lumber supply in an 
orderly manner by directing available lumber to the most 
essential of th® conflicting demand. The control system 
provided for a quarterly summation of the requirements of 
all important consumers, .and a balance of total requirements 
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against total- anticipated supply for the sane period* Gnce 
a decision was reached on the quantity of lusher to he allo­
cated. to each competing demand, individual consumers within 
each demand area were authorised to receive lumber in ac­
cordance with the over-all program determination. Inasmuch 
as potential lumber users ranged .fro® the individual house­
holder purchasing a few board feet to repair his fence to -the 
industrial concern using a Million board feet each month to 
crate manufactured equipment, a nuiaber of different proce­
dures were established, each adapted to the se-gment of con­
sumption and the individual consumer to which it related, 
The lumber control established by WPB Order L-335 to 
the spring of 1944 governed all lumber except certain species 
and grades subject- to established administrative procedures.^ 
Under the terms of the control plan, industrial users of ®ore 
than 50,000 board feet per calendar quarter made application 
to the War Production Board for authorisation to purchase. 
The application form called for a reporting of past and an-
ticipated quarterly shipments of all products (mad© of wood 
or not} made in each "inventory accounting, unit" of each 
manufacturing plant* Shipments of fabricated wood products 
were further analyzed by preference ratings s© that the 
importance of the products themselves could be appraised and 
3principally aircraft grade# of Sitka spruce and Hoble 
fir, shingles, lath, railway and aiae ties, hardwood floor* 
lug* and log segments produced for conversion into veneer* 
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the volume of their output controlled through lumber 
authorisations* Purchase requirements were submitted ia 
species and thickness detail for softwoods, and species and 
fprade detail for hardwoods* Applicants also reported con­
sumption by species for the preceding, calendar quarter and 
end-of quarter inventories. This group of industrial users 
accounted for the bulk of the total lumber needed for wood-
products manufacture, shipping containers {produced in both 
commercial and captive plants), and dunnage* Each military 
and export agency filed a master application for its total 
calendar requirements of lumber to be purchased for its own 
account. 
Small industrial consumers (using less than 50,000 
board feet quarterly) were authorised to receive lumber with* 
out filing individual applications. These small industrial 
consumers were authorized to place "certified" orders for 
quantities neeessary to carry out production schedules 
authorised under the Controlled Materials Plan or any other 
regulations of the War Production Board. 
Certain large industrial users (such as mines and 
smelters, petroleum companies, and construction jobs author­
ized by WPB or other federal agency) were authorized to pro­
cure lumber on the authority of the basic orders or certifica­
tions governing their operations. Farmers were authorised 
to buy lumber by author! gat ion. a issued through local offices 
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of the War Pood Administration. The WPB made available a 
quantity of lumber for farmers which the War Food Administra­
tion divided among its local offices. The County War Board 
offices authorised individual farmers to purchase lumber 
under quotas established for each office. 
All buyers in the foregoing classes defined their 
purchase orders as "certified orders»" thereby informing 
their suppliers that the consumers were authorized to re­
ceive the lumber ordered. Such certified orders received by 
retail and wholesale lumber distributors were extendable to 
the sawmills. In this way, each lumber dealer was permitted 
to purchase and make available to his customers or replace 
in his stock that quantity of lumber which the customers 
were authorised to buy. At the same time buyer-seller 
arrangements were largely maintained, together with the ad­
vantage of a continuance of the competitive relationships of 
the lumber market. The control was made complete by a pro­
hibition of sawmill deliveries except on certified orders. 
No preference ratings were issued under the lumber 
control plan established under WPB Order L-335. When con­
sumers had ratings to get production materials for a product, 
maintenance materials, or operating supplies, they used the 
same rating to obtain lumber. If the consumer did not have 
* rating he got one in the same way as a rating for any 
other material (except farmers who got a rating through the 
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lar Food Administration). 
The control provided both th© information and the 
administrative machinery required to balance supply and 
demand each calendar quarter, to cut back less essential 
requirements to the extend necessary to satisfy more essen­
tial needs, to justify the cutbacks by reference to the more 
important claims against available supply, to distribute pro­
curement authorisations to individual consumers within th® 
over-all pattern established by Requirements Committee deter­
mination, and to assure the orderly distribution of lumber 
from sawmill to ultimate consumer so as to secure the most 
effective utilization of all types of lumber for the total 
war program. In the application of the control, the total 
quantity of lumber for which certified orders could be placed 
•fc-
was limited to tc^al supply. Each lumber user had reasonable 
assurance that the quantity of lumber he was authorized to 
receive during the succeeding calendar quarter actually 
would be delivered. Integration of the machinery with other 
isPB controls provided for the distribution of lumber to 
authorized programs in such aanner as to support levels of 
production for which other critical materials had been al­
located. 
Probably the aost important change introduced by 
L-335 was its organization of a new philosophy of distribu­
tion control* Fro® the beginning of the war production 
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drive until the spring of 1944, military procurement of 
lumber had been free fro® all restrictions, the policy of 
the WPB Lumber Division, stressed ia all of its limitation 
and conservation orders, had been to facilitate every direct 
Military need, without review of its urgency ©r of the impact 
of unlimited military purchasing on other lumber require­
ments, Many of which had an important relation to the ful­
fillment of military programs. The net effect of this policy 
had been to lodge in the hands of the Central Procuremeut 
Agency acting for the military services whatever measure of 
control existed over lumber and to leave a minimum of resid­
ual authority in the iMmbmr Division of the War Production 
Board. Order L-335 accomplished a complete reversal of this 
position. Allocations of specified quantities of lumber 
were mad© to the military agencies. Indirect Military re­
quirements were given adequate protection within the limits 
of anticipated supply, as were export and essential domeatle 
civilian needs. Artificial deficits, created by the common 
practice of multiple placement of purchase orders, were re-
moved. And above all, the focal point for control, together 
with responsibility for its administration, was reassigned 
to the War Production Board, the only effective source of 
management for an integrated control system. 
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OPA Price Controls, la so far as timber product 
prices were controlled against the market forces of supply 
and demand and in so far as these controls were unbalanced 
with other commodities as well as between various tiaber 
products, there were prise problems that influenced produc­
tion* 
Long before the declaration of war, leaders in busi­
ness and government were fully aware that stringent action 
would have to be taken to prevent a run-away inflation. The 
public wanted the Government to hold down the cost of living, 
but there was little realization that inflation controls 
would require the sacrifice of immediate financial gains for 
the more lasting benefits of a stable economy. 
There were advanced two general approaches to the 
problem of economic stabilization. The first (Baruch Plan} 
requested a general eeiling on every item of commerce or 
service. The chief advantage of this method was the com-
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economy, agriculture, labor, and business would be treated 
as parts of a single, living, sensitive organism. An es­
sential condition of the Baruch Plan was that the general 
ceilings be established on "somm date on which the normal 
operation of the law of supply and demand cas be said to have 
controlled prices." Thus, adjustments would be necessary 
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only to adjust prices which for one reason or another were 
not at satisfactory levels on the base date. 
The alternative to a general ceiling was "piecemeal 
prise fixing." Under this plan ceilings would be placed on 
the prices of commodities as and when they exhibited infla­
tionary behavior. It was thought that this selective 
approach would permit the prices of individual confaodities 
to rist when increased supplies were needed, for defense pro­
duction. Moreover, the Government would be able to deal 
with dangerous price rises as they occurred without regulat­
ing the entire economy. However, in practice, commodity 
price controls could not prevent increases in the cost of 
living, as long as consumer purchasing power exceeded the 
available supply of goods. It therefore became necessary 
to supplement price control with other anti-inflation de­
vices—wage stabilization, increased taxes, appeals for 
increased savings, and reduction in installment credit. By 
the end of January, 1942, the Emergency Price Control Bill 
became law. 
The chronological list of price regulations governing 
timber products, in general, reflects the emergence of the 
various commodities as problems. During prestatutory OPA 
fifty percent of wholesale prices were brought under control 
with 105 Price Schedules (PS), 120 voluntary price agree­
ment®, warning letters and suggestions--the so-called 
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"Jawbone Control.n Later, these were reissued under the 
law and also Maximum Price Regulations (MPS) were establish­
ed. The Maximum Price Regulations that were issued for 
primary forest products are listed in th© appendix. 
Meed For Coordinated Controls. Measures necessary for 
th© control of timber products must necessarily be geared to 
any general system of managing the economy. Mo industry or 
segment thereof can be treated individually with any exten­
sive degree of success. The present economic structure is 
so interwoven that to disturb one part of the whole soon 
produces repercussions felt more-or-less throughout the whole 
structure. All economic controls must be coordinated to 
result in a smooth functioning economic machine. 
The previous section dealing with price controls 
hinted at the ramified nature of the problem . It is quite 
obvious that any industry such as the timber industry cannot 
effectively be placed under price controls while the rest of 
the economy is left to function freely. Less understood are 
the guide lines to preserve the inter-price ratios between 
industries when all are brought under control, as well as th# 
maintenance of intra-price relationships within industries. 
Khen price control policies deviate fro® the established 
pattern of prices, economic stresses and strains are set up. 
For example 9 an. out-of-line price on structural steel might 
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shift demand in the construction industry toward concrete 
which in turn might increase the demand for lumber to build 
forms» Also, within the timber industry for example, a dis­
proportionately high celling on palp logs and bolts might 
unduly attract t© the paper manufacturers the critically 
needed raw Materials of the lumber, pole, Bine timber, and 
other such timber products industries. The sensitivity of 
prices and the market activity they may cause is quite varied 
between products, legislations placed on prices to control 
Inflation or direct production mast be wisely done to avoid 
inequity and distorted results. 
The prior section that treated War Production Board 
controls was purposely narrowly Halted to the timber products 
industry. Even when the discussion was confined to that 
industry the problem was not simple. Ihen the complexity of 
production controls in the timber products industry is further 
confounded with the problems of inter-industry relationships, 
the difficulty in its true light can be appreciated. An 
example of the inter-industry type of production problem was 
that of manpower. Sow skilled timber workers were lured to 
higher paying industries, and how the industry suffered, at 
least for a tine, at the hands of indiscriminate draft 
boards have been already recounted» Similarly, the alloca­
tion of equipment, supplies, food, and clothing must be 
equitably distributed to all Industries including the timber 
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products industry., In addition, a just distribution of the 
essentials of production roust be balanced within an industry 
not only among its various segments, bat also between large 
and small operators In order to assure maxirrdzsd productive 
efficiency. 
The tremendous job of .managing the economy can be 
divided into two major categories. The first category is 
the problem of providing suitable and workable controls of 
all significant cofflaoditi.es and services, and the other 
problematical category is to coordinate these controls into 
a smooth functioning and efficiently productive economy, It 
is certainly a job to challenge the finest brains of the 
country. 
CHAPTER III 
PROBLEMS OP THE PURCHASER OR CONSUMER 
(PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS} 
Production of adequate and satisfactory products for 
war is an enormous problem. Part of that problem is for 
manufacturers to know how much and what kind of commodities 
to make. Then, too, few goods are used where they are made, 
so a further task is to see that they are transported to con­
sumption points at the proper time in quantities and qualities 
desired. Finally, the Batter of payment in proper amount, 
after the order is satisfactorily filled, completes the 
transaction. Procurement may cover this whole field from 
advising the manufacturer what to produce to the final check­
ing and payment of the delivered articles. In this section 
of the report only the procurement problems in obtaining 
timber products for the Army, Navy, Defense Plant Corporation, 
War Shipping Administration, Lend-Lease, and the Maritime 
Commission are considered. 
During the war period some six billion dollars were 
spent to procure timber products for the above six agencies. 
When the si&e of that purchasing job, together with speci­
fication complexities, and price and transportation dif­
ficulties are considered in providing such commodities as 
construction lumber, aircraft veneer, and white oak for ships; 
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the monumental stature of the task can be appreciated. The 
problems encountered in procurement can usually be relegated 
to one or more of the following categories! {1} Organisa­
tional and administrative problems, (2) Specification prob-
lems, or (3) Distribution problems® 
It is futile to try to evaluate one category oyer the 
others as the more important of the procurement problems, 
Commonly they existed together, and to try and establish 
individual importance would be but academice Perhaps the 
most obvious problem and the one that first caused an un­
mistakable bottleneck was the organizational difficulty 
encountered in tgiing to procure as usual in the rocketing 
expansion for defense. Procurement in this situation night 
be termed the pre~Cantral Procurement Agency Period which 
existed until Septeiaber 1, 1942. How the six agencies ob­
tained their timber requirements before the establishment of 
the CPA follows: 
The Army, prior to 1942, delegated its timber product 
procurement activity to nearly all of the technical branches. 
However, by far the balk of these products was obtained 
through the Procuring and Expediting Section of the Office 
of the Quartermaster General. The Construction Division of 
the Quartermaster *Corps was charged with troop housing and 
facilities at camps, posts, and stations both in the zone of 
interior and at foreign installations, as well as other Army 
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facilities construction» 
Similarly* nearly all bureaus of the Navy procured 
timber products for tiieir own requirements, but under a gen­
eral tendency to centralize such procurement in the Bireau 
of Supplies and Accounts* Am important exception to this 
tendency was new shore installation construction which was 
handled fey the Bureau of lards and Docks or its contractors. 
Obtaining timber products for ship building was a function 
of contractors engaged in ship construction, the Bureau of 
Ships, and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. 
The War Shipping Administration, Maritime Commission, 
and the Defense Plant Corporation were not directly involved 
with procurement of timber products® It was the responsibil­
ity of their contractors to procure their requirements® Pur­
chases for lend-lease accounts were handled by procurement 
officials of the Treasury Department. 
Hie usual government procedure in procuring supplies 
is to offer invitations to bid, setting forth coaasodity 
descriptions, specifications, quantities required, and other 
pertinent Information. Bids are received, evaluated, and 
accepted or rejected» This method supposedly assures free 
competition, resulting in the greatest value for money ex­
pended by the Government® Actually, it is sometimes a 
cumbersome and somewhat costly arrangement» 
When the floods of d#f#n®« buying and construction, 
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were loosed in 1941, the usual procurement methods bogged 
iown* A vivid example of why this happened is shown in the 
following sketch of one of the first large Army lumber pro­
curement jobs® Two million feet of lamb®? was required for 
four new Army easaps* Invitations to bid on the project were 
sent out in accordance with the .usual procedure. Three 
hundred thousand sheets of paper were used in the coapilatioa 
of these bids; more than 250,000 prices were swbuitted* Froa 
a pool of accountants awaiting Government assignment, the 
Army borrowed thirty accountants who worked night and day for 
ten days in an effort to organize the multitudinous bids into 
a shape where awards could be made* Twenty typists were kept 
busy writing telegrams alone.® The abstract sheet on this 
job was five feet wide and 120 feet long and it took so many 
weeks to reach the award stage that when the successful 
bidders were notified, the stock upon which they had made 
their bids had reached various stages of depletion. 
To cut through the red tape and expedite lumber pro­
curement the Quartermaster Corps of the Army developed .an 
auction system of buying timber products,. Vendors were 
notified of the time, place» and quantities of timber prod­
ucts to be bought. At the auction3 and with the requirements 
iternizedj the suppliers could bid on as much as they felt 
they could supply« Awards were made to the lowest bidder. 
If a representative of the using agency of the contractor 
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was present, the contracts were drawn on the spot. In any 
case, the supplier could notify htis sawmill and production 
could be started immediately and the recipient, if not pres­
ent, could confirm the bid by telephone or wire and contrast 
could be drawn up later* 
The fiavy had a procurement plan that lay somewhere 
between the usual bid procedure and the A ray auction plan. 
They organized prospective suppliers into groups and rotated 
the opportunities to bid among the groups. 
In addition to the problem of the tremendous amount 
of paper work under the procurement-as-usual setup, there 
were other complicating and confusing factors. The unre­
stricted competition between the various government agencies, 
war contractors and civilian interests had detrimental 
effects on timber products procurements Prices began to ris# 
rapidly as demand exceeded supply* This commonly channeled 
the lumber and other timber products to the buyer who could 
pay the most for it, regardless of the essentiality of the 
ultimate use. This situation brought a plague upon suppliers 
is the forti of hordes of experienced and inexperienced buyers 
plus a general abundance of ssealous expediters. Producers 
complained of the large amounts of their time required to 
deal with the numerous public and private buyers and expedi-
tors* It is hard to evaluate the production loss occasioned 
by the surplus of these procurers 9 but the tendency is to 
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underestimate it. 
Uncontrolled, competitive purchasing also caused 
actual misuse aad wast® of the production facilities of the 
industry. Mills often not equipped to produce special prod* 
ucts would accept such orders with patriotic motives, while 
better equipped mills were producing less essential items. 
Maldistribution of available supplies of timber 
products, was another and important consequence of decentral­
ized procurement* There were instances where local and 
relatively small quantities of materials were vitally needed 
but which could not be filled because the total local sup* 
ply was drained away in large shipments for camps, ships, 
or factory construction® Sometimes large contractors, need­
ing a relatively few items or goods, would purchase the 
entire output of a mill aad resell what they did not want to 
largely non-essential users. Even between essential users 
it was to be expected that some contractors and agencies 
were better organized, more efficient, and perhaps more ag­
gressive than others* This contributed so seriously t© 
.maldistribution that the issue had to be solved« 
In December, 1941, the Amy construction program was 
transferred to the Corps of Engineers. The auction plan of 
procurement of timber products was continued to such good 
effect that soon the Army was getting nearly all of its 
requirements and other agencies and contractors w®ra 
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experiencing difficulty,, In order to solve this situation, 
a Central Procuring Agency was established in the Corps of 
Engineers on September 1» 1942® The principal reason for 
its organization was to alleviate maldistribution of con­
struction lumber and to cut through the confusion created by 
the uncoordinated and competitive purchasing by the various 
agencies and defease contractors# It centralised the pro­
curement of timber products for the Mar and lavy Departments, 
Maritime Commission, War Shipping Administration, Defense 
Plant Corporation and Lend-Leas®, including the contractors 
to these government agencies® 
Procurement through CPA was quite simple ia process. 
Eequests for materials were submitted to CPA by the using 
Service for both their own and their contractors* needs as 
they arose, CPA would place the items up for bid at their 
next auction or if the need was great enough a special 
auction might be called. Procurement was also made by direct 
negotiation with the vendor or by mean® of sealed bids, but 
the auction system was moat widely used and satisfied most of 
the requirements® ' • 
Procuring for the several agencies places CPA in a 
semi-judicial role in allocating the scarce lumber to the 
various users* For guidance in allocating critical iteas 
when inter-agency demands conflicted, CPA was buttressed by 
a Luaber Advisory Board» ©©agisting of a representative of 
each using agency. If the conflict could not be resolved 
there, appeal was provided to the Lumber Committee of the 
Army and Navy Munitions Board® It speaks well of the cooper™ 
ation between the lumber-using agencies that reference to 
higher authority was never necessary by the Advisory Board„ 
S&me of the procurement prob3.ems were not solved even 
by the improvements inaugurated under the CPA system. The 
problem of opacifications was notably in this category. 
Specification problems can be generalized into three cate­
gories: Specifications were either (1) too high, (2) too 
low, or (3) were uncommon or otherwise problematical. 
Specifications considered to® high nay be completely 
Justified and if so the problem was then one of inadequate 
forest resources or other production problems. Where the 
specifications are considered too high and less exacting 
qualities would suffice, it was a procurement problem. An 
example of the latter sort occurred in the change-over from 
pre-war to the expansion for defense „ During the relative 
trickle of pre-war purchases, some high specification items 
were procured with no trouble or question# However, when 
the war expansion required large volumes of these stringent*® 
ly specified items bottlenecks aros® due to blind insistence 
©n the established specifications® A reappraisal of them 
might have lowered the threshold, enabling the fulfillment 
of reqmir»««Bts on at least some of the critical items,* In 
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a buyer1 s market a. vendor will tolerate elaborately exact 
specifications, but in a shift to a seller's market, as oc~ 
curred early in the war period, suppliers were quick to side-
step items difficult to supply, and inordinately high speci-
t 
fications provided a real, but artificial shortage* Hie 
t 
obvious solution is a constant, technical, and critical 
attitude on all specifications, a weighing appraisal of 
specification changes to avoid confusion and production al­
terations, and careful designing, where applicable, to put 
requirements within easily supplied specifications* 
Specifications that were too low were infrequent and 
not of much consequence, The damage in this case arises in 
excessive replacement, of the too lowly specified items„ For 
example, difficulty was experienced during the war in pro­
curing 5/4 (l§~*ineh thick) lumber that was sufficiently dry 
to meet the specifications for tent pins. When the specifi­
cations were lowered to include 4/4 stock, the requirements 
were met but the pins split so easily that It necessitated 
the purchase of greater quantities-
tlnfaailiarity with the timber products industry and 
the properties and characteristics of the various wood 
species was perhaps the most important factor leading to un~ 
commonness and other difficulties in writing specifications. 
Examples of this sort arose in some of the early cantonment 
designs* Some were based mm a 10-foot module, requiring 
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dimension lumber ia that length. This is an uncommon lumber 
length, since most logs are cut eight or sixteen feet long, 
fo produce large numbers of 10-foot pieces requirts cutting 
th® lumberf resulting in waste of Materials and time. In 
another instance ia krmj post theatre designs, unusually long 
dimension lumber wms specified for the back of the stage* 
These and other mischance specifications caused considerable 
delays and unfilled orders which could have been eliminated 
by proper design and specification supervision. 
Analysis of the CPA Inquiry Files {requests for lumber 
by the using agency) showed that three-fourths of the speci­
fication problems originated on the buying side; whereas, 
the other fourth of the problems clustered around the pro­
ducer. Two-thirds of all the specification problems were 
caused by changes ia the specifications or plans; a fourth 
by the vendor being unable to meet th® specifications; and 
about ten percent of the problems was caused by materials 
ordered not being suited for the job. The incidence of 
specification problems, as would be expected, was heavier at 
the start of the defense mobilisation* They increased in 
numbers until the fourth quarter of 1943* when they started 
declining. A sharp drop in specification problems by the 
aiddle of 1944 was interpreted as the result of corrective 
action on specifications to bring them into line with the 
industry* s ability to fill, a a well as the lowered lumber 
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eonsusipti©a from the 1942-43 peak® 
Efficient transportation is a necessary accomplice in 
procurement-producer teamwork# The War Production Board, 
estimated 1.5 million carloads of lumber were shipped in 
1942• Transportation was & tremendous job all through the 
war. Soae abases were perhaps unavoidable; many of the dif­
ficulties and inefficiencies might have been eliminated. 
Cross-hauls of lumber between producing areas was a 
waste of valuable transportation equipment and time. Un­
coordinated purchasing was a factor ia this situation. For 
example, in 1942, 18,75^ carloads of softwood lumber were 
shipped into the Southern Pine Producing Area froa the Pa­
cific Northwest, while 636 cars, during the same year, hauled 
southern pine lumber into the Pacific Northwest. Part of 
such seeming transportation waste was justified by military 
necessities, but the part that can be minimized by planning 
and coordination should be accomplished. 
The common .military transportation problem of assembl­
ing materials in central depots only to be later reshipped to 
the areas from which they came also figured in wasted lumber 
movements* Also, the usual rail shipping problems of getting 
orders in even car amounts, obtaining prompt unloading®, fur­
nishing government bills of lading, and having the necessary 
car requirements {especially gondola cars} posed many mis­
cellaneous procurement hindrances attributable to transporta­
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tion, It can be assumed that the- responsible authorities 
ia most of these and similar cases aim to keep these imped* 
iments at a toinifauii,, 
Manpower problems, forest resource depletion, and 
other factors had closed down some 9,500 sawmills by 1944* 
This put an added burden, on t ran sport at, ioa in shipping lumber 
to these .areas formerly supplied by local mills. This rela­
tively small increased transportation problem serves to 
focus attention on the basic need for well-distributed and 
adequate, forest resources.. 
Besides transportation as a procurement difficulty! 
there were two other factors that affected distribution; 
namely, prices and delayed payments® 
-Unintentional influences brought about by OPA regula­
tions caused some procurement impediments3 One example of 
this type of difficulty was. news-leaks of forthcoming price 
ceiling increases, which caused operators to hold up ship­
ments ia order to gain the additional remuneration. Later, 
this sort of problem -was minimised when shipments under ex­
isting contracts were assured of any subsequent price raises.. 
The price-, procurement probleii prior to OPA centered around 
bidding up critically needed timber products to perhaps 
exceptional cost to the government* After OPA regulations 
Vers established, prices were not allowed free movement 
to bring forth needed production of critical items while 
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curtailing manufacture of plentiful commodities. This 
caused some price procurement problems. OPA responded with 
mme price adjustments, but in so far as they were delayed, 
inadequate, or not allowed, procurement was handicapped. 
Belayed payments for timber products delivered to the 
government caused various degrees of procurement difficulties* 
There were examples of five to six months' delay in payment 
©f some orders. Most producers are financially unable to 
carry such commitments and it is perhaps illogical and im­
proper to expect the® willingly to do so. Some difficulties 
arose due to the inability to bring destination receipts 
into agreement with shipment bills. Car tallies not being 
included in some shipments, caused some later discrepancies. 
The sis© of the emergency shipments; the usual, hectic 
construction scenes at receiving points; and the somewhat 
intricate government procurement channels, fiscal procedures, 
and accounting methods all added up to reason for payment 
delays, tout nevertheless, that appeared as insufficient 
justification to some operators who hesitated in selling t# 
the government for this reason. 
CHAPTER IY 
WEIGHING Til SITUATION FOR THE FUTURE 
Some problems of timber products production, and 
procurement will undoubtedly be different in another emer­
gency* Instead of shuttle blocks and shunt -poles being in 
short supply, for example, ski blanks and snowshoe frames 
may be the critical items. But, whatever the pattern of war 
demands, wood will be called upon to fill a host of uses* 
%hat could take the place of lumber and plywood for construc­
tion and crating, poles and piling for their uses, and rail­
road ties in the nation's transportation system? The timber 
demands for these and other uses aight rise to staggering 
proportions should American cities come under military 
action. 
Foremost in an appraisal of the timber products situ­
ation to meet another emergency must com© the question of 
forest resources* The true importance of this factor of 
production was obscured in the last war by other more immed­
iate and more easily correctable factors, such as manpower, 
equipment, production controls, and procurement procedures. 
To gauge the full importance of the forest resource factor, 
imagine perfect and easily reached forests by every saw­
mill; abundant, quality logs for all the veneer lathes; and 
the necessary species, volumes, and qualities needed t# fill 
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the other timber products requirements® la this situation 
timber products production or procurement problems would be 
insignificant^ It is the forest resource problem that is 
the heart and the key to the difficulty. 
The forest resource shortage largely explains the 
current and significant high price of lumber which is fifty 
percent la excess of the price index for other building com* 
modities; the migration of the lumber industry across the 
coatiaent aad the present decline ia numbers of large saw-
stills; the lengthening hauls from woods to mills; the begin­
ning exodus of the plywood veneer mills from the long-time 
center around Puget Sound to northern California; the in­
creased pressure la demands for national forest stumpage; 
these and other weather vanes indicate without question the 
depletion of our timber resources* 
The dwiadliag volume of standiag sawtimber is but oae 
facet of the problem. The volume remaining is aot well dis­
tributed* In the West, the last stronghold of virgin timber, 
sixty-five percent of the standing volume of sawtimber is 
growiag oa but tweaty-three percent of the national sawtimber 
area® The North and South are characterised by forests that 
have been cut-over aad depleted„ la the South an increasing 
number of mills are euttiag six-inch trees aad it is aot 
uncommon to see a logging truck carrying fifty or more logs* 
Obviously9 mills operate ,m such small logs only because the 
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supply of larger timber is scare®. The maldistribution of 
the remaining sawtiaber also adds to the nation5 s transporta­
tion problem. 
In addition to the standing sawtiraber bsiag depleted 
and that what remains being centered largely ia the north-* 
west, the age classes in the nation'a forest growing stock 
art unbalanced and otherwise deficient to assure a sustained 
production of timber* la the North, for an example of poorly 
balanced age classes, almost half the commercial forest land 
bears only seedlings or is denuded* There are great areas 
of land that could be in process of 'growing timber, but by 
negligence and lack of foresight are not fully productive, 
either by being inadequately stocked or completely denuded. 
For the country as a whole there is prevalent understocking. 
About thirty-six percent of all the commercial forest land 
is deforested or has less than forty percent of the number 
of trees required for full stocking® Concomitant problems 
of growing adequate timber supplies is the enormous non-
commodity drain from our forests in the fora of fire, insect, 
disease, and wind, ice and other damage * Over the entire 
forest problem and adding to its complexity is the intricate 
ownership pattern between federal, sub-ordinate governments 
and private owners. 
The concept of comparing the national timber growth 
with tiaber drain to weigh the sustained yield possibilities 
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has many limitations that can only be suggested here* Soma 
persons in the industry point to the near balance of all-
timber growth and drain at around thirteen billion cubic feet 
per year* fMs apparent balance Masks a number of serious 
deceptions among which are: (1) the unbalanced age classes 
which causes too mush of the growth to occur on very young 
trees; (2) the heavy cutting of desirable species, which 
makes much of the growth figure upon undesirable species; 
and (3) the distinction that four-fifths of the drain comes 
from sawtimber while growth of trees in that category fall 
short of meeting the drain by fifty percent. Proa the econom­
ic standpoint a future balance Might be achieved in several 
different ways® 
Augmented imports of raw timber materials and prod~ 
ucts is one way to bring about a balance, but such optimism 
is limited as there is less opportunity to increase our im­
ports than might be supposed. Although traditionally consid­
ered as timber exporter to the world, since 1940 this 
country has been on a net import basis for lumber. However, 
the net Imports of lumber represent less than two percent of 
total lumber production® Similarly, the imports and exports 
of railroad ties, plywood and veneer, and poles and piles 
are a very small percentage of total production of these 
commodities• The North Temperate Zone softwood or conifer 
forests are by far the most important source of the world*s 
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timber supply. Significantly, Russia possesses one-third of 
this supply. There is no indication that the fabulous tropi­
cal forests can take the place of the North Temperate Eon© 
softwoods* All in all, there is a world shortage as well as 
a domestic shortage of timber. 
An undesirable method of balancing our timber budget 
would be to allow increasing shortages of timber to develop 
and the balance com© about in the forest products market 
through substantially increased wood prices and consequent 
curtailment in consumption* From a military standpoint alone8 
such a course is untenable. 
There is no easy way and no substitute for a far-
reaching program to bring the nation* s forests under good 
management to insure timber products for the future. It is 
a possibility that the present elouded international situa­
tion will not precipitate into World War III, but will remaia 
a continuous emergency, a conflict of attrition® In any 
case, the close correlation between the adequacy of the for­
ests of the country and its economic well-being has long been 
recognized. One of our foremost economists, 1 in analysing 
the future national income of the United States, predicted 
that in expansion of output the economy would consume more 
raw materials in the next thirty years than have been con­
*8uaner U* Slighter, wMow Big im I9$0n» the Atlantic. 
November, 1949» 
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sumed in the last century and a half. Wood is one of these 
raw materials. 
On the forest resource problem the nation faces some-
* 
thing of a dilemua. The cry is to increase output. let even 
the present rate of sawtiraber cutting exceeds the annual 
growth. The job is a long time one and treraendous, but not 
hopeless. The problem should be attacked quickly, it worsens 
with drifting and delay. The former abundance of our forest 
resources has unfortunately tended to camouflage their vital 
importance. It seems prudent militery planning that the 
decline of our forest resource to® checked and revised. De­
tailed treatment of the problem with reco»mendations is con­
tained in another report.^ 
A principal, immediate concern in an emergency is the 
status of timber products inventories throughout the country. 
The booming construction period following the war delayed 
filling the war-spent lumber stocks. However, by the end of 
1949 the war-low lumber inventory figure of 4*6 billion board 
feet had been raised to about half the pre-war inventory of 
eighteen billion feet. At the end of 1950, the figure was 
estimated at nine billion board feet. Plywood and veneer 
atocka have never been more than insignificant in recent 
2"Forests and National Prosperity, A Reappraisal of 
the Forest Situation in the United states,* Forest Service, 
ISM, Misc. Pub. No. 668. 
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years due to incessant demand. Railroad ties, poles and 
filing stocks are about normal. Th© long seasoning period 
for these items is an important consideration in judging 
stocks. It is important that the budding National Production 
Authority controls do not interfere with the building of 
plentiful timber products inventories. Currently, there is 
some danger in this direction. 
In order to assure the best and most efficient us® of 
the forest resources and stocks of timber products on hand 
in another war emergency» th® Forest Products Committee of 
the Munitions Board made the following immediate recommenda­
tions : ̂ 
Actions which should be started 
in* advance of an emergency 
1. Establishment of a "critical list® of timber 
products. 
2. Export controls for products on the critical list# 
3. Stocking products on th® critical list. 
4. Building up, if feasible, mill and distribution 
yard stocks to form an adequate cushion against a 
sudden increase in military construction require­
ments. 
3Interim Report to Munitions Board from the Forest 
Praduet# Gosaiaittee, July 19, 1946. 
5* Accelerated research in the improved utilization 
of wood, development of substitutes, etc., as a 
means of conserving the supply of usable timber. 
6. Intensive field surveys to determine location and 
volume of stands of specialty and quality timber. 
7. A large-scale program of access road construction 
on public lands. 
A comprehensive program of statistical informa­
tion on forest products. 
9. Advance planning of the timber controls to be 
instituted at the start of an emergency, including 
adequate estimation of military requirements by 
the Department of National Defense. 
Actions which should be taken 
at the onset of an emergency 
1. Over-all allocation of all forest products in 
short supply. 
2. Complete control over inventories, 
3. Full coverage by appropriate conservation, liaita-
tion and preference rating orders, 
4. Issuance of cutting directives to producers. 
5. Subsidising high-cost producers. 
6. Subventions to producers to maximize production 
of critical it#««# 
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7. Special aids to producers in the procurement of 
stumpage. 
8 .  Technical advice and assistance to producers, 
9. Putting in the field an adequate force of for­
esters and other technicians to facilitate the 
various production-incentive programs, and to en­
courage leaving land in productive condition. 
Since forest products production is intimately con­
nected at all levels with the rest of the economy, the 
Forest Products Committee recognized that it should be 
equitably treated in the over-all control of industry* the 
nature of the timber-products industries is such that extra­
ordinary measures are required in certain fields. They sug­
gested the following actions? 
1. Control over employment, wages and hours, so that 
skilled woods and mill workers can be retained, 
the necessary additional labor recruited, and pir­
ating of labor by better-paid industries eliminat­
ed. 
2. Control over all supplies and equipment, so that 
the necessary food, clothing, fuel, trucks, trac­
tors, etc., can be channeled where most needed to 
increase production. 
3. Control over all prices of timber products in 
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short supply, and possibly stumpage as well, as 
a part of over-all prist control assumed to be 
necessary in an emergency, and to prevent serious 
dislocations ia the flow of essential timber prod­
ucts to authorized consumers. 
4» Control over all transportation facilities so 
that timber products can be Moved without undue 
delay t© authorised consumers and t© consumption 
points where most urgently needed. 
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APPEIDXX 
A SUMMARY OF CONTROL MEASURES IN WORLD WAR II 
APPLYING tO LUMBER AID OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS 
(EXCEPT WOOD PULP AID PAPER PRODUCTS)1 
The Office of Production Management, and later the War 
Production Board, the Civilian Production Adoinistrat io n, and 
the Office of lousing Expediter issued general priorities 
regulations under which business operated during the emer­
gency. 
The purpose of these regulations was to state the 
basic rules which applied to all business transactions unless 
covered by more specific regulations or superseding orders. 
In general, the priorities regulations established preference 
ratings, limitations on inventories, allocation classification 
systems, production requirements plans, and the procedures for 
obtaining and assigning preference ratings, duration of pref­
erence rating orders, acceptance of orders, sequence of deliv­
ery, appeals from specified orders, and other procedures nec­
essary to the operation of the priorities system. 
The Office of Price Administration was an agency 
established to control prices in the managed war-time econ­
omy in an effort to avoid inflation. The approach of this 
authority was similarly by a General Maximum Price Regulation 
from which later specific commodities were excepted and spe­
cifically controlled» 
Specific regulation of forest products (except pulp 
and paper) by both production and price authorities are 
listed belowi 
War Production Board Conservation Orders - "y Series 
{To curtail the use of" critical Material's) ' 
H-63 General laaaort Order. (December 1941). To conserve 
the supply anS" direct the distribution of strategic 
materials in which shortages exist and which are im­
ported. The forest products covered and the data 
From Materials Survey, U.S. Dept. Agriculture, 1950* 
Complete details on all. control measures matj to# found la ap­
propriate issues of the- Federal Register. 
ai 
when they were included in the order follow; 
1 © Logs and Lumber: 
a. Balsa (June 1942} 
b. Mahogany (June 1942} 
c. Boxwood (June 1942} 
d. Prima vera {April 1943) 
e. Spanish cedar (April 1943) 
f. Fir, other than Douglas-fir (April 1943) 
g. Pine, other than northern white and 
Norway (April 1943) 
h. Albarco (Jane 19431 
2. Tannin wood, hark, or extract: 
a. Quebracho (Jane 1942) 
b. Mangrove (lay 1943) 
3. Charcoal (June 1942) 
4. Pulpwood {January 1944) 
Order ff-63 revoked May 1947» 
M~$3. Teak* General Preference Order* (March 1942). To 
conserve the supply and direct the distribution of 
teak to meet military requirements, chiefly for ship 
decking. Revoked March 1943. 
w-122. Mahogany and Philippine Mahogany. General Conserva­
tion Order. (May 194217 '&> restrict the sale, deliv­
ery, production and use of mahogany, Philippine ma­
hogany, and albarco to aeet military requirements, 
chiefly for aircraft, boat, and ship building, Re­
voked September 1945* 
5.-177. Balsa. General Conservation Order. (August 1942). 
To restrict the sale, delivery, production and use of 
balsa to meet military requirements, principally for 
life preserving equipment, aircraft, buoys, ship build­
ing, and gyroscopic equipment. Revoked July 1945• 
K-186. Sitka Spruce Logs. General Preference Order. (July 
1942). To allocate and restrict the use of aircraft 
grades of Sitka spruce logs and lumber to meet mili­
tary requirements. Revoked September 1945* 
M-208. Softwood Lumber. Conservation Order. (August 1942). 
To control the distribution and use of all types and 
grades of softwood lum&er through the establishment of 
preference ratings* Revoked August 1944. Superseded 
by Order L-335. 
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11-209. White Oak. General Conservation Order, {August 
1942)". To restrict the us® of white oak logs wholly 
for fabrication into implements of war, chiefly air­
craft, weapons, ships, tanks, and vehicles. Expired 
November 1943» 
14-228. Noble Fir Logs. General Preference Order. (Septem­
ber 1942}. To allocate and direet, or prohibit, the 
us® of loble fir logs, or any part sawed therefrom, 
to meet military requirement s, principally for air­
craft. loble fir was the most desirable alternate 
for Sitka spruce* Revoked May 1944* Renewed by es­
tablishment of Order M-3&6, February 1945« 
K-229. Western Hemlock Aircraft Lsms* General Preference 
Order. (Septeraber'1^42}. ¥0 allocate and direct, or 
prohibit, the use of western hemlock aircraft logs, 
or any part sawed therefrom, to meet military require­
ments. Revoked April 1944. 
M-234* Douglas-fir Logs. General Preference Order. (Septem­
ber 1942). to allocate specific quantities of Douglas-
fir logs, or any part sawed therefrom, to specific 
persona, and to direct or prohibit particular uses of 
such logs, or the production by any person of partic­
ular lumber items from such logs, to meet direct and 
indirect military requirements, such as aircraft 
material, pontoon lumber, ship decking, planking, and 
plywood. Revoked September 1945. 
M-248. Rattan. General Conservation Order. {October 1942). 
To restrict the sale, delivery, processing, and use 
of rattan (virtually all of foreign origin) to meet 
siilitary requirements, chiefly for boat fenders, hos­
pital wheel chairs, use in occupational therapy, para­
chute rings, and cap bands. Revoked September 1945. 
14-251. Pulpwoods General Preference Order. (October 1942). 
To' control the distribution and use of pulpwood 
through allocation and to direct it to specific prod­
ucts or purposes; to require the establishment of re­
serve supplies; and to limit or prohibit particular 
uses of designated types in any area where a shortage 
is found to exist in order to meet military and essen­
tial civilian requirements, levoked August 1945. 
1-277. Vegetable fanning Materials. General Conservation 
Order* "TFebruary 1943)* To restrict the distribution 
and um of domestic and foreign supplies of vegetable 
tanning materials to meet military and essential 
S3 
• civilian uses. The order covered the following domes­
tic raw materials and extracts: C&lifqraia pate bark, 
cellulose sulphite by-products {deleted 'Marc nsSTTT 
cheatnut oak bark* chestnut wood, healock bark* and 
suaac. Chestnut extract (indispensable in the tanning 
of sioe sole leather, transmission belting, and other 
heavy leather products) was placed under complete al­
location January 1944- Revoked November 1946. 
11-279» Yellow Poplar. General Conservation Order. {Febru-
ary 1943)« To allocate yellow poplar aircraft logs 
and direct their•production into aircraft-type lumber 
and veneer to meet military requirements. Revoked 
November 1943. 
H-2&9* Charcoal. General Preference Order. (February 19431* 
fo restrict distribution and use of charcoal by large 
users to meet military and essential civilian needs, 
chiefly for processing metals and curing meat and to­
bacco. Revoked September 1945. 
H-300. Chemicals. General Allocation Order,, 
Fine far. Schedule 14 {April 1944). To estab­
lish authority to allocate pine tar and tar oil 
obtained by distillation of pine wood by the re« 
tort or kiln process for purpose of meeting mil­
itary and essential civilian uses, chiefly for 
rubber compounding and reclaiming, cordage for 
fishing nets, oakum for lavy ship building, and 
veterinary and pharmaceutical uses. Revoked 
July 1945. Superseded by Order 1-340, September 
1945* 
Pine Oil. Schedule 73 (ffovaaber11944). To 
transfer the allocation provisions of Order 
M~365» governing pine oil, to Chemicals General 
Allocation Order M-300, and thereby simplify in,-* 
ventory controls. Revoked September 1945. 
*1-340. Miscellaneous Chemicals. General Preference Order. . 
To govern "tKe purchase"of miscellaneous chemicals 
which are ultimately delivered to or incorporated in 
materials for the military, certain other Government 
agencies, or any "preferred purpose" listed in the 
order. 
Gum and Wood Rosins. (February 1945)» 
iPia». far* (August 1945). 
Revolted September 1945* 
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K-343. Box-veneer* Conservation. Order. (August 1943). To 
establiilT"production quotas for producers of box-
veneer aad confine the sale of box-veneer produced to 
meet such quota %o box manufacturers la order to meet 
requirements of export shipments aad essential domes­
tic uses. Revoked September 1945. 
I4~35lt* Black Walnut Logs» Conservation Order* (December 
i$43). To~°proHiSit the use of black walnut logs for 
uses other than gunstocfcs and gunstoek flitches, and 
provide for releas® of aaterial unsuitable for swell 
uses. Revoked April 1944. 
M-359* Port Orford Cedar. Conservation Order, (November 
1943'} • To allocate all Port Orford cedar logs, or any 
parts cut therefrom, and to direct or prohibit the use 
or production of such Materials in order to meet 
direct and indirect military requirements, chiefly-
battery separators* -Revoked July 1945« 
M-361. Southern Yellow Pine. Conservation Order. {December 
1943)"= To provide, through certification or special 
authorisation, for strict allocation of southern yel­
low pine lumber {except lath, shingles, and cross 
ties) produced by the larger mills for the purpose of 
conserving, supplies of such lumber for direct and in­
direct war uses. Revoked August 1944® Superseded 
by Order L-335* 
15-364. Hardwood Limber. Conservation Order. {December 
1943)* To provide, through certification or special 
authorisation, for strict allocation of oak, ash, 
hickory, yellow birch, hard maple, rock elm, beech, 
and pecaa (added later) luaber (excepting shingles, 
lathe, and .cross ties} produced by the larger mills 
for the purpose of conserving supplies of siuch lumber 
for direct and indirect war uses. Revoked August 
1944* Superseded by Order L-335. 
ii-3650 fine Oil* Allocation Order. {May 1944). To estab­
lish authority to allocate pine oil and to restrict 
its distribution and use to meet Military and essen­
tial needs, chiefly for disinfectant purposes. Re­
voked November 1944. Superseded by Order M-300, 
Schedule 73* 
}:-3$6« Motole Fir Aircraft Logs and Lumber. General Liasi&a-* 
ties "Ord#rT {February l533*}~ §#"""reestablish the 
authority to allocate aad direct, or prohibit,, the 
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use of Moble fir aircraft logs and lumber to meet mil­
itary needs* Moble fir originally controlled in 
September 1942 by Order M-228 and revoked in May 19%4. 
Revoked September 1945 • 
14-33?. Rosin. Conservation Order. {February 1945). To con­
serve g«a and wood rosin by restricting distribution* 
use, and inventories to meet military and essential 
civilian needs. Revoked July 1946. 
War Production Board and Civilian Production 
AtlSlalitra^ioii Xln^tation drleri*" 1̂ "L* Serfei 
(To curtail the production of particular products 
to save materials generally.) 
i-41. Construction. Conservation Order. (April 1942). To 
prohibit' "construction not essential to the war effort 
by requiring certification of new construction, and 
thereby conserve materials, equipment, and labor need­
ed to meet war requirements. Revoked October 1945« 
L-121. Construction Lumber. Limitation Order. (May 1942.} 
"For 105 days, to limit the sale and delivery of soft­
wood construction lumber by producers (other than 
small producers}, or authorised intervening persons, 
to military agencies and their contractors and sub­
contractors, excepting certain specified persons for 
specified uses, in order to meet the military con­
struction program. Revoked September 1945. Super­
seded by Order M«2Gd. 
1,-150. Douglas Fir Plywood. Limitation Order. (June 1942). 
To restrict the' production and distribution of mois­
ture-resistant type of Douglas-fir plywood to specified 
types and sizes, with certain exceptions (primarily 
military orders!; and later (June 19431 to require 
prior approval of production and delivery schedules ia 
an effort to channel all softwood plywood production 
in Washington, Oregon and California to war and es­
sential civilian uses. Revoked August 1945. 
L-150-a Softwood Plywood. Limitation Order. (December 1942}® 
To limit salesT™*shipments, and deliveries of softwood 
through wholesale and retail channels to orders bear­
ing ratings that were issued only to military and 
essential civilian needs. Revoked August 1945® 
£6 
L-150-b. Plywoods Limitation Order. (December 1942). To 
require" that the newly developed Hutment grade of 
Douglas-fir plywood be produced ia accordance with 
specifications in the Order and sold for the single 
purpose of constructing temporary military housing. 
This grade of plywood served as a substitute for 
other exterior types of plywood. Revoked June 1943* 
L-21S. Douglas-Fir Lumber* Limitation Order. (October 
1942). To "make 'the maximum amount of Douglas-fir 
lumber (produced ia Washington and Oregon west of 
the crest of the Cascade Mountain range) available 
to the armed force® by restricting the sale, ship­
ments, and deliveries by producers to only the Central 
Procuring Agency of the Corps of Engineers and their 
agents, or through the. War Production Board* Re­
voked August 1944* Superseded by Order L-335. 
L-227-b. Wood cased Pencils and Pen Holders. General Limita­
tion Order.. (September"1943 )'• To control the pro­
duction of wood eased pencils and pen holders 
through establishment of maximum quotas and to re­
strict the use of rubber and prohibit the use of 
certain critical metals in their aianufacture. These 
products were previously controlled by Order L-22?, 
issued December 1942» Revoked May 1945• 
L-232. Wooden Containers for Fresh Fruit and Vegetables. 
Limitation" Order. (March 1943)* To standardise and 
simplify specifications for wooden containers for 
shipping fruits and vegetables ia order to facilitate 
the re-use of containers and thereby conserve lumber, 
metals* and manpower. Revoked August 1945® 
L-232*-a. Wooden Shipping Containers for Oranges and Grapefruit® 
Supplemental Order* (November 1943). To liait the 
shipment in wooden containers of oranges and grape­
fruit originating in Texas, California, and Arizona 
to a certain percentage of their total production in 
order to conserve lumber. Revoked November 1944# 
L-260» Furniture. General Limitation Order. (February 
1943). To prohibit new patterns of wood furniture, 
to reduce the existing patterns by two-thirds, and 
to limit the use of iron and steel in the manufac­
ture of wood furniture* Included Venetian blinds. 
Revoked April 1944. 
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L-260-a* Furniture. General Limitation Order. {December 
1943•) TO restrict use of lumber for furniture and 
crating of furniture, and to limit the use of cer­
tain grades of seven particularly critical hard­
woods needed for Amy track bodies and other impor­
tant uses. Revoked August 1945* 
1-263. Matches. Limitation Order. (February 1943). To 
restrict the size of matches and the use of materials 
therein for the purpose of conserving lumber, chem­
icals, wood pulp, and wire. Revoked August 1945« 
L-2&3• Brooms. General Conservation Order. {August 1943)• 
fo "limit the amount of metals used in brooms, to 
restrict the diameter of broom handles, the number 
of coats of finish, and the number of sewing seams, 
and to limit the number of designs in which various 
types of brooms can be made. Revoked March 1944. 
L-2S5. Boxwood. Limitation Order. (April 1943). To limit 
the use of dogwood logs, cants, flitches, and blocks 
to the manufacture of shuttles. Revoked August 1945* 
L-290. Western Lumber. Limitation Order. (May 1943). To 
restrict the sale, shipment, or delivery of the 
following species produced by all except small mills 
in the twelve western states; Ponderosa pine, Idaho 
white pine, sugar pine, lodgepole pine, white fir, 
Western white spruce, and Engelmann spruce to the 
Central Procuring Agency of the Corps of Engineers, 
or their Agents, or to persons specifically author­
ised by the War Production Board. Revoked August 
1944. Superseded by Order L-335» 
L-335. Lumber Consumers* Requirements Order. (March 1944)* 
(In June 1944 and thereafter known as "Lumber Con­
trol Order.") Originally, to require all major con­
sumers of lumber to file applications giving their 
requirements for second and third quarters of 1944-
The comprehensive revision of June 1944 set up pro­
cedures for all but the smallest sawmills (produc­
ing 100,000 board feet of lumber or less annually) 
to deliver lumber; for distributors receiving and 
delivering lumber, and for all consumers receiving 
lumber; and to control, through quarterly authoriza­
tion, the amount of lumber that large industrial 
consumers may receive. Revoked September 1945• 
Directions 1-5 to L-335. (July 1944). Provide 
that sawmills over certain sizes wist give military 
dft 
orders precedence up to specified percentages of 
their anticipated monthly shipments of certain 
species* The species covered by the five directions 
ares 
Direction 1: Douglas-fir, white, fir, noble fir, 
^£tka spruce {except aircraft grade) and hemlock 
produced, in Oregon and Washington west of the crest 
of the Cascade Mountain range. Revoked August. 1945• 
Direction 2% Ponderosa pine, sugar pine, lodgepole 
pin®, Idaho whit© pine, white fir, Douglas-fir, 
Western white spruce, Eagelaann spruce, and larch 
produced in the area generally known commercially 
as the Western pis© area. 
Direction 3: Redwood produced in California* Re­
voked August 1945 • 
Direction 4: Southern yellow pine produced in 
eleven southern states, Revoked August 1945. 
Direction Red or Yellow cypress, chiefly pro­
duced in South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, and 
Louisiana. Revoked August 1945« 
Direction 1A to 1,-335. {April 1945)• To provide 
that sawmills covered by Direction 1 must manufac­
ture at least forty percent of their montly produc­
tion of Douglas-firj white fir, and West Coast hem­
lock in one-inch boards and at least twenty-five 
percent in two-inch dimension* Eevoked August 1945* 
Direction 2A to L-335. {December 1944). To limit 
the receipt oT~Western pine lumber to designated 
claimants and consumers having specific authoriza­
tion from the War Production Board, Revoked August 
1945. 
Direction 6* {August 1944). To provide for the 
sale of MoT 4 or lower grades of Douglas-fir, south­
ern yellow pine, western hemlock, western red cedar, 
Sitka spruce, and No. 3 or lower grades of all 
species of hardwood on uncertified orders. Revoked 
August 1945. 
Direction £. (July 1944). To permit sawmills not 
covered by Directions 1 to 5 to accept and make de­
livery on uncertified and unrated orders of lumber. 
Revoked August 1945* 
Direction I# |«luly 1944) * To establish the pro­
cedure by which lumber distributors obtained a lim­
ited amount of lunber intended for sale on uncerti­
fied and unrated orders, thereby providing for the 
needs of the small private consumer and the small 
industrial consumer without ratings. Revoked Aug­
ust 1945® 
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(1-335 cont*d.| 
Direction $A to L-335. (September 1944)* To permit 
lumber distributors, for a four-months period, to 
deliver to small private consumers aad small indus­
trial consumers accumulated stocks of slow aoviag 
items which were not adaptable to war uses, aad to 
permit sawmills aad distributors ia certain areas 
to dispose of their excess stocks of Douglas-fir, 
larch, and red cedar to farosrs ia those areas. Re­
voked January 1945. 
Direction £« ' (July 1944). To prohibit the us® of 
certain grades of white oak, Idaho white pine, spruce, 
ponderosa pine, sugar pine, white fir, and red cypress 
in the manufacture of 26 types of products; to pro­
hibit the use of any species except birch, beech, 
maple, pecan, aad oak in the manufacture of hardwood 
flooring; aad to prohibit the use of certain species 
aad .grades for dunnage. Revoked August 1945. 
Direction 10. (July 1944)• To define aad clarify 
what is meant fey "receipts of lumber" during third 
quarter, 1944- Revoked January 1945. 
Direction. 11. .(^^Ly 19441. To provide that any 
""sSaHT*may deliver ash lumber to any ash specialist 
without restriction. Revoked August 1945. 
Direction H.. (August 1944). To allow large con­
sumers'"bf' lumber to receive a part of their fourth-
quarter allotments of hardwood during the third 
quarter. Revoked January 1945• 
Direction 15. (September 1944). To allow delivery 
of "veneer 'flitches to manufacturers without regard 
to the provisions of L-335, and to clarify the re­
porting requirements of veneer manufacturers. Re­
voked January 1945• 
Direction 16. (September 1944). To permit farmers 
to receive without certification up to 5,000 board 
feet of lumber annually if produced from trees cut 
from their own farms. Revoked January 1945* 
Direction 17* (April 1945). To require wholesale 
lumber dealers and commission men handling southern 
yellow, pine lumber to report to the War Production 
Board their monthly volume of sales of such lumber 
to show how much was going to various uses. Revoked 
August 1945. 
Direction 18. (Kay 1945). To permit distribution 
yards'with mamon ownership to pool certified orders* 
Revoked August 1945. 
M44* Picker Stick. Blaakn. Liaitatioa Order. (April 1945K 
T© prohibit the use of hickory picker stick blanks 
for any purpose except the manufacture of picker 
sticks. Revoked August 1945o 
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L~35Go Softwood Veneer, Limitation Order, (August 1945). 
fo 'channel 'softwood veneer produced in Washington, 
Oregon, and California to softwood plywood manufac­
turers aad to box manufacturers and to limit the 
use of such veneer solely to the manufacture of 
plywood and shipping containers. Revoked August 
1945. 
L-358. Softwood Plywood* Limitation Order. (October 19461 * 
To provide that manufacturers of softwood plywood 
must produce and reserve a percentage of their pro­
duction in construction and door panel grades? to 
require that a part of the reserve be delivered to 
distributors on unrated and uncertified orders, and 
the balance on orders covering highly essential 
projects (M M ratings) and on certified orders from 
distributors and manufacturers of certain housing 
product© and certain other essential items. Revoked 
March 1947. 
L-359. Lumber, lardwood Flooring and Hi11work. Limitation 
Order, {October 1946}'. fo provide that sawmills 
shall produce a percentage of their total production 
of lumber in housing construction lumber and hard­
wood flooring lumber which is to be held for certi­
fied and rated orders from distributors and manu­
facturers of certain housing projects, and other 
items. Revoked March 1947» 
Civilian Production Administration - Veterans' 
Emergency Housing Program Orders - VHP & PR Series 
{To divert critical materials from cieTerable or 
less essential construction to veterans* housing.} 
PR-33. Veterans1 Emergency Housing Program. (December 1945)• 
To assist private builders, educational institutions 
and others to build moderate-cost housing accommoda­
tions for which veterans of World War II would be 
given preference by assigning an HH preference rat­
ing for certain materials (including lumber, hard­
wood flooring, raillwork, and softwood plywood) needed 
for construction. Specific directions to PR-33 ap­
plying to forest products (and the purpose of the 
direction) are as follows; 
Direction 1 to PR-33. Lumber. Hardwood Flooring. 
and MiXIworfc. {January 1946). To require saw­
mills (cutting annually over two million board 
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feet of softwood or one million board feet of 
hardwood) to produce a percentage of their total 
production in housing construction lumber and 
hardwood flooring for certified orders (with an 
HI rating) froa distributors, prefabricators, 
hardwood flooring manufacturers, and housing con­
tractors. Revoked November 1946® 
Direction 1A to PR-33» Softwood Plywood» (March 
XP^)« To require manufacturers of softwood ply* 
wood to produce a percentage of their total pro­
duction in construction and door panel grades 
and reserve a percentage of those grades for 
certified orders (with an HH rating) froa prefab-
ricators, distributors? stock cabinet manufactur­
ers. and housing contractors. Revoked October 
194"» 
Direction $ to PR-33. Prefabricated Housing, 
'('March' 194^}. To explain how "manufacturers of 
prefabricated houses, sections or panels, may get 
Hi ratings for certain materials, including lus­
her fflillwork, hardwood flooring, and softwood 
plywood. This direction was transferred to OHE 
in March 194? and revoked in April 1943. 
YHP-2. General Restrictions on Hardwood Lumber. (July 
1946} . " To prohibit builders"from'using beech, birch, 
hard maple, oak, or pecan boards or dimension lumber 
for framing, wall or roof sheathing, boxing, siding, 
or subflooring in any house, building, or other 
structure in order to conserve the short supply of 
such species. Revoked February 1947. 
VHP-5. Douglas-fir and Western Pine Shop Lumber. (April 
1947). ~ fo' restrict the 'delivery o£ "a large portion 
of certain sizes and grades of Bouglas-fir and 
western pine shop lumber to millwork or cut-stock 
manufacturers. Revoked June 1947. 
Office of Housing Expediter Veterans1 Emergency 
Housing Program Orders - SPPR Series 
(To stimulate production of *building materials by pro­
viding premium payments for materials produced above 
established quotas.) 
£JPPE»2» Softwood Plywood. (June 1946}* To stimulate addi­
tional production of softwood plywood by providing 
for premium payments m peeler logs consumed in ad­
ditional production of softwood plywood above 
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established quotas and t® establish such quotas, 
and the methods, procedures, and conditions under 
which premium payments may be obtained. Revoked 
April 1943. 
JSPPE-4® Standing Timber on State Owned Lands, (July 1946J * 
To stimulat© additional production of lumber and 
other forest products fro® standing timber on State 
owned lands by providing for premium payments to 
states to enable tit#® to utilia© additional facili-' 
ties for asking such ti®b«r ready for sale. Revoked 
April 194i. 
EPPR-6. Hardwood Flooring - Southern Area. {August 1946). 
To stimulated additionalproduction of hardwood 
flooring in the southern area by providing for prem­
ium payments on production of such flooring above 
established quotas* Revoked April 194#• 
EPPR-7. Hardwood Flooring - northern Area. {August 1946), 
fo""stlfflulat® additional production of hardwood floor­
ing in the northern area by providing for premium 
payments on production of such flooring above estab­
lished quotas* Revoked April 1943. 
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OFFICE OP PRICE ADMINISTRATION MAXIMUM PRICE ISOtTLATIOWS 
(To establish price ceilings on individual products in an 
effort to curb inflation*} 
Primary Forest Products-*-
MPR 54 B©uglas-fir peeler logs 
(Revoked June 1942. Superseded 
by MPR 161.) 
MPR 161 West Coast logs 
MPS 216 Eastern railroad ties 
,MPR 25? Pulpwood produced in Lake States 
MPR 284 Viestera primary forest products 
(Revoked September 1944* Super­
seded by MFls 554, 555, and 556, 
MPR. 313 Veneer legs 
MPR 324 Eastern fenc© posts 
TUP!2 30 Pulpwood cut ia Southeastern 
States 
KPR3 346 Eastern lags and bolts 
GMPR Order lo. 16. Picker stick 
blanks produced ia North and 
South Carolina 
1PR 361 Pulpwood produced in Mew York and. 
northern Hew England States 
MPR 3#7 Pulpwood produced in South Caro­
lina, Georgia, and Florida 
MPR 36$ Pulpwood cut in certain South­
eastern States 
'PMPR 32 Pulpwood cut in designated 
Eastern States 
Effective Date 
December 1941 
December 1941 
September 1942 
November 1942 
February 1943 
February 1943 
March 1943 
April 1943 
April 1943 
April 1943 
«ay 1943 
May 1943 
June 1943 
APrior to the establishment of specific maximum prices, 
most of the primary timber products (poles, posts, piling, 
split stock, mine timbers, and similar semi-finished timber 
products) became subject t© the General U&xiwam Price Regula­
tion in June 1942. Cord wood sold for firewood was subject to 
GMPR, but cordwood sold for processing into lumber or pulp 
was not. Logs sold for processing into lumber, veneer, etc., 
also was not subject to GMPR, For each individual seller, 
the maximum prices for any of the products subject to GMPR 
could be no higher than the highest price he charged for 
delivery of the product in March 1942# 
mŝ ismm prie« regulation* 
^Geaersl maximum prim regulation* 
C Primary Forest Products cont'd) 
tfHT 4115 Pulpwood produced in designated 
States west of the Mississippi 
River 
KPR 433 Pulpwood produced in Morth Caro­
lina and certain portions of 
Virginia 
Iff® 437 Pulpwood produced in ©astern 
Virginia 
MPS 460 Western timber 
KPR 464 Pulpwood cut in designated Eastern 
States 
Iff® 491 Pressure preservative treatment of 
forest products and pressure 
treated forest products 
MPR 503 Western contract logging services 
KPR 530 Import prices for pulpwood pro­
duced in the Canadian Provinces 
of Quebec, New Brunswick, and 
Nova Scotia 
KPR 533-1 Central logs 
MPR 533-2 Lake States log® 
i-fPR 533̂ 3 Appalachian logs 
IIPR 533-4 Southern logs 
MM 533-5 Northeastern logs 
MPR 533-6 Florida logs 
MPR 534-1 Black walnut logs 
MPR 534-2 Hickory and ash logs and other 
specialty woods 
Insulation and felt cordwood and 
related products 
MPR 535-2 Lake States cordwood 
MPS 535-3 Excelsior wood 
MPR 535-4 New England cordwood 
MPS 535-5 Chestnut cordwood 
MPS 535-6 Stave and heading bolts 
MPR 535-7 Chemical cordwood 
MPR 536 Western fence posts 
MPR 554 Western red cedar poles and piling 
MPR 555 Western poles and piling 
KPR 556 Western railroad ties and wood 
mine materials 
MPR 55s Eastern wood rain® materials and 
industrial blocking 
KP! 559 Eastern poles and piling 
IIPR 560 Northern white cedar poles and 
piling 
MPR 565 Pulpwood contract logging ser­
vices in designated Eastern 
States 
KPR 535-1 
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Effective Date 
June 1943 
July 1943 
July 1943 
August 1943 
August 1943 
November 1943 
January 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
Hay 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
May 1944 
September 1944 
September 1944 
September 1944 
September 1944 
September 1944 
September 1944 
ioveaber 1944 
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Eastern Softwood Lumber and Millwork 
MPE 
MPE 
MPH 
MPE 
MPE 
MPE 
MPS 
MPR 
MPS 
MPE 
MPl 
MPE 
MPl 
MPS 
MPH 
MPR. 
OSA 
19 
19A 
219 
222 
293 
3di 
412 
454 
433 
513 
525 
539A 
53 9B 
539C 
601 
6od 
Southern pine lumber 
Log-ran southern pin© lumber 
Northeastern softwood lumber 
Northern softwood lumber 
Stock millwork 
Stock screen goods 
Tidewater red cypress lumber 
Aromatic red cedar lumber 
"General Manager Type" grain 
doors and temporary coal doors 
for box cars 
Yellow cypress lumber 
(Revoked August 1945- Superseded 
by MPR 971. 
Jobber sales of stock millwork 
Gusto® Killing and kiln drying of 
softwood and hardwoods in the 
Northeastern area 
Custom milling and kiln drying of 
softwoods and hardwoods in the 
Southern area 
Custom milling and kiln drying of 
softwoods and hardwoods in Mid­
west and Great Lake States 
Softwood mouldings 
Special millwork 
Directive 94 Southern pine 
lumber 
"Effective d 
September 
April 1944 
September 1942 
September 1942 
January 1943 
May 1943 
June 1943 
August 1943 
October 1943 
February 1944 
April 1944 
September 1944 
March 1945 
March 1945 
November 1945 
May 1946 
January 1946 
Western Softwood Lumber and Millwork 
MPE 13 Douglas-fir and other softwood ply^ 
wood 
MPR 26 Douglas-fir and other West Coast 
lumber 
MPR 44 Douglas-fir doors 
MPE 109 Aircraft lumber 
{Revoked October 1945. Super­
seded by MPE 290.} 
MPE I64 Western softwood shingles 
MPE 253 Redwood limber and millwork 
MPE 290 Sitka spruce lumber 
MPE 402 Western red cedar lumber 
August 1941 
October 1941 
December 1941 
April 1942 
June 1942 
November 1942 
January 1943 
June 1943 
^Office of Stabilization Administrator 
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Western Softwood Lumber and Millwork 
MPl 539 Custom milling and kila drying of 
Western softwoods 
IfPE 589 Douglas-fir stock millwork 
{cont'd} 
Effective date 
June 1942 
June 1945 
Hardwood Lumber and Miscellaneous Wood Products 
RPR 
mm 
MPR 
MPR 
KPE 
KPE 
97 
146 
155 
196 
21? 
218 
MPH 223 
MPR 2ai 
MPR 338 
«PR 
MPl 432 
MPl 45S 
IfPE 501 
!#R 538 
MPR 568 
MPR 603 
MPR 611 
Southern hardwood lumber 
Appalachian hardwood lumber 
Central hardwood lumber 
Turned or shaped wood products 
Walnut lumber and walnut gun-
stock blanks 
Eastern wooden mine Material and 
industrial blocking 
{Revoked November 1943* Super­
seded by MPl 216 and each of the 
hardwood lumber reflations.) 
Northern hardwood luaber 
Mavy oak ship stock 
Aircraft veneer 
Supplementary Regulation No. 14. 
Grain doors sold to railroads 
Northern hardwood flooring 
Oak, pecan and miscellaneous 
hardwood flooring 
Hardwood small dimension 
Commercial veneer 
Hardwood plywood 
Suprlus lumber 
Mahogany lumber 
February 1942 
May 1942 
June 1942 
August 1942 
Septeaber 1942 
September 1942 
September 1942 
December 1942 
March 1943 
March 1943 
July 1943 
August 1943 
December 1943 
June 1944 
December 1944 
Moveaber 1945 
June 1946 
Distribution 
MPR 215 Distribution yard sales of soft­
wood lumber 
MPl 46? Distribution yard sales of hard­
wood luaber 
September 1942 
Septeaber 1943 
Ifod Containers 
MPS 11? Used egg cases and used component 
parts 
!<LPE 160 Seasoned wo odea agricultural 
containers 
(Revoked February 1943* Super-
seiei by MPR 320*) 
April 1942 
June 1942 
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Wood Containers (contfd) 
KPR 176 Box grade veneer 
MPR li6 Western wooden agricultural 
containers 
HPS 195 Industrial wooden boxes 
1-SPR 320 Eastern and central wooden agri­
cultural containers 
I4PR 342 Mail .kegs, staves and heading 
MPR 424 Tight cooperage stock and sawed 
tight cooperage 
MPR 434 Used fruit and vegetable con­
tainers 
MPR 4$1 Slack cooperage and cooperage 
stock 
MPR 4&5 Wirebound boxes 
MPR 520 West Coast cooperage 
MPR 524 Used tight cooperage 
MPR 593 Used slack cooperage 
Effective date 
July 1942 
July 1942 
August 1942 
February 1943 
February 1943 
April 1943 
July 1943 
April 1943 
June 1943 
March 1944 
April 1944 
August 1945 
laval Stores 
GMPR Am. 5 Wood and gun naval stores 
MPR 179 Pine Oil 
MPR 297 Natural resins 
MPR 44© Pine tar and pin® tar oil 
TMPR 36 Qua rosin 
MPR 561 Gum rosin 
June 1942 
July 1942 
January 1943 
August 1943 
June 1944 
September 1944 
Other Forest Products 
MPR 312 Maple sugar aad syrup February 1943 
MPR 352 Chestnut extract April 1943 
MPR 431 Charcoal July 1943 
MPR 531 Imported vegetable tanning 
materials May 1944 
MPR 551 Certain sales of hemlock and 
chestnut oak barks August 1944 
All maximum price regulations not previously revoked 
were revoked oa November 10, 1946» 
